To higher: I see 8 vehicles, five armored cars with 23mm guns, and three 6-wheeled vehicles with 73mm guns headed our direction, potentially more. They seem to be moving in a staggered column, and I think they will arrive at my platoon's position in about 10 minutes.
-If given the go-ahead to engage: Request reinforcements and air support.
To platoon: I think there are 8 vehicles, five armored cars with 23mm guns and three 6-wheeled vehicles with 73mm guns headed our direction, possibly more. They seem to be moving in a staggered column, and I think they will arrive in about 10 minutes. O/O, we will ambush the enemy force at the bridge IOT protect the battalion. Vehicles 12, fall back to vehicle 23, and vehicle 13 to vehicle 22. Vehicles 55 and 57 move 2800m from the bridge out of range of enemy weapons and engage the enemy with 90mm. Scout teams find cover in the woods in the north and south of Route 12 with AT-4s. From there, on my order, we will use the bridge as a chokepoint to bottleneck the enemy in an ambush until reinforcements arrive.
I went this way as I feel like, even if outnumbered, using the bridge as a chokepoint with the firepower we have, we should be able to hold off the enemy until reinforcements arrive. If we don't get the go-ahead to engage, then I would let it pass. However, if communications fail, I would still engage and send a runner IOT alert the battalion to the enemy position without running the risk of them finding our battalion's defensive position as they continue their movement. This reminds me of some of the situations Rommel found himself in Infantry Attacks, and his aggressiveness is what comes to mind here. However, I am new to this (OCS grad have not been to TBS yet), so let me know what you all think.
First of all, awesome to see you in the game taking your PME seriously prior to attendance of TBS! Congratulations on graduating OCS and committing to leading Marines. It’s an awesome, difficult and extremely rewarding journey you have set on.
With regard to your orders, I have some thoughts I’d like to respectfully offer:
1st: a transmission to higher is rarely more important than generating situational awareness and tempo for your own unit. The enemy is 10 min away! Our Marines need to get moving! Higher can wait, your Marines need direction now. Consider in the future flip-flopping your priorities. Issue orders to your Marines, then report to higher.
2nd: eliminate “mother may I” mentality from your decision making cycle. There are situations where the higher commander may issue you very detailed engagement criteria which outlines when you can and cannot begin to engage the enemy. I don’t think this situation is one of them. I ask you why you included the phrase “If given the go ahead to engage”? Why do you need to clarify permission from your company commander to execute the mission you have already been assigned? What if you can’t get comms with higher in time? You are a commissioned officer, you are the leader on the deck, in the moment, with the most clear understanding of the situation. I recommend replacing “asking permission” with “relaying intentions.” The phrase “I intend to (ambush the enemy reconnaissance element)” is much stronger. It creates more ownership on your part and puts your commander in a good position where he can easily approve your actions. Execute your mission, exercise YOUR military judgement, and keep him in the loop. Generally, as long as you are executing the commander’s intent you are headed in the right direction.
3rd: it seems your plan involves ambushing the enemy at the bridge and holding him there until reinforcements arrive. I ask, does this plan align itself to the intent of your commander? You are a reconnaissance and security element who has been instructed NOT to be decisively engaged. Why do you want to hold the enemy at the bridge? We are still 10km from friendly lines. What do we gain by making a stand here? Could we accomplish your vision while also maintaining the freedom to disengage if the enemy is larger than we expect? How will your dismount scouts withdraw from their positions once their ammunition is depleted?
Hope these questions/ thoughts were at least somewhat helpful. Let me know what you think!
I agree with Apostle. In time-sensitive situations, orders first, reports later. You already have the latitude to engage the enemy as long as you don't get decisively engaged. No need for permission.
Platoon Frago: 8x enemy armored vehicles 1500m south along rte 12, moving north towards us. 5x vics with 23mm, 3x vics with 73mm
Mission: This may be the lead element of a larger enemy force. We will allow the column to pass if possible IOT observe follow-on forces, but be prepared to engage this column if they spot us
Execution:
- 2nd section: move to ambush site West of Hill 114, oriented towards route 12. Your priority is the armored cars with 23mm cannons
- AG section (main effort): come with me to ambush site in the woods vicinity of Hill 116, oriented towards route 12. Our priority is the vehicles with 73mm cannons
- Vic 13: hold security at the eastern edge of the woods to the east of Hill 116
- FO: get all the fires you can ready to hit route 12 along our kill zone
Admin:
- Do not fire unless spotted or on my order
- Our rally point is vehicle 13
To company:
Enemy recon element of about 8 armored cars is moving north on rte 12, from cp 41 to CP 73. I am setting an ambush in the vicinity of Hill 116. I intend to allow them to pass in case they are the lead element of a larger enemy force
I recommend you send the platoon to my north down to an ambush site east of me along route 12 to kill this column. I also recommend you send the attack helicopter section to scout route 12 south of CP 44 IOT find any larger enemy body
My initial thought was to just spring the ambush, then ford the river to the south and continue the recon down route 12. But I think that's missing the forest for the trees. The enemy has had just as much time as us to prepare an attack, and a large patrol like this coming down a major route is how it would begin. Given my mission of providing advanced warning, I'm going to let the company commander deal with this recon element while I continue to provide early warning along the most likely route of advance.
I'm setting myself up to destroy the enemy column if they spot us, but if they slip by then I can maintain observation of the bridge and CP 73. Meanwhile, if the company commander follows my recommendation, there'll be another platoon behind me to hit that enemy patrol, and an attack helicopter section moving down route 12 to find any enemy vehicles more quickly than I can.
If the company commander orders us to engage, we'll kill them quickly and rally a few hundred meters to the west. From there, I'll most likely bypass the ambush site by moving south along the eastern edge of the map, ford the stream south of the woods, and *slowly* continue my patrol. I want to get away from the burning vehicles marking my position and get eyes back on route 12 ASAP
Interesting. I'm thinking if I ambush this element and it turns out to be the advance element of something bigger, I will learn that fast enough when the main body reinforces. If you do let this element go by are you concerned that you may end up with an enemy company behind you and something bigger in front of you?
On platoon tactical net: “All stations this is 4 Actual, listen up. Enemy motorized column spotted 1500m south of CP73 moving north. Looks like scout cars in the lead followed by light armor. I can see 8 vehicles so far. I think they’re going to cross the bridge.
Mission: Platoon ambushes enemy column to delay their movement east while gaining information on enemy intentions.
Execution: we establish the kill zone on the east side of the bridge. massed surprise fires ambush against enemy reconnaissance element. I initiate ambush on lead vehicle. Assault guns destroy far targets at the bridge. Ambushing sections work targets near to far and far to near respectively. IDF isolates follow on enemy forces from the kill zone. 2nd section covers our withdrawal east along RTE 12.
2nd section: establish delaying position to cover friendly withdrawal. Reference wood line east of hill 124. Stay concealed until ambush is initiated.
AG: main effort. Establish ambush position IVO hill 116. Maintain hull defilade.
1st section: we will establish ambush position IVO hill 114. Maintain hull defilade.
Coordinating instructions:
- FO: coordinate IDF on far side of bridge to isolate enemy forces from the kill zone.
- This is going to be a quick hit and run. Scouts will not dismount. Order of withdrawal will be 1st section, then assault guns, then second section. We will work bounding over watch as needed to break contact.
- be prepared to execute follow on ambushes to delay the enemy force if needed. If we get indications that this is a larger enemy force, we will start spinning up CAS and coordinating with the adjacent platoons to get at these guys.”
Our mission is to provide intelligence and early warning of enemy action and intentions. We have an opportunity to fight for information here while also hampering the enemy’s plans.
If we successfully ambush this element and it is just a recon unit conducting a similar mission to our own, then we have damaged the enemy reconnaissance effort.
If they are the reconnaissance screen to a larger force, we will learn that quickly after engaging and uncover information about a much larger enemy movement for the friendly company and battalion to action on.
Either way, the opportunity for action is here, we stand in a very strong position if we can maintain the element of surprise, mass our fires quickly and leverage our maneuverability to quickly fade away before the enemy can grab a hold of us.
Reports to higher at this point are a nice to have, not a need to have. If we have the time, a report to higher about the current situation and our intentions (prior to ambush) is a good thing to provide our higher commanders to build their understanding of the situation. The more valuable report to make is the one that we will give after the ambush. How the enemy reacts will tell us much about their intentions, which is what our commanders really want to know
Great minds, as they say, Apostle. I like your use of IDF to isolate the objective area. I'm thinking full vehicle defilade rather than merely hull defilade. I think the enemy commander's Spider sense is likely to be tingling and he'll be scanning the high ground very closely for turrets.
Platoon: We've got a company-size enemy security detachment heading our way, vicinity Checkpoint 41 on Route 12 moving north. They'll be here in less that 10 minutes. We're going to set up an ambush east of the bridge, with a kill zone between Hill 124 on the south and Hills 114 and 116 on the north.
2nd Section: Establish vehicle defilade position vicinity eastern slope of Hill 124. Engage from the front of the column back.
Assault Guns: Establish vehicle defilade position vicinity Hill 116. Engage the 73s.
1st Section: Establishes vehicle defilade position vicinity Hill 114. Engage from the rear of the column forward.
FO: On-order linear target on Route 12 covering the kill zone.
Everybody is complete vehicle defilade until I give the order to pop and engage. Be prepared to withdraw quickly in order 2nd, 1st, AGs.
I think there's a good chance the enemy will turn east at Checkpoint 73. I want to hurt him if he does. The area east of the bridge and between the hills offers a great ambush site, although a bit tight. I'm also considering the site might appear obvious to the enemy and he might suss it out, so I'll pay careful attention to that and be ready to abort and fall back quickly if I get the sense he is not going to cooperate. I'll try to time it so that indirect fire will begin impacting in the kill zone to get the enemy to button up just before I spring the ambush.
There's also a chance the enemy will turn west at Checkpoint 73 and head back to his friendly lines, in which case I'll look for a chance to hit him in the rear.
I could engage the enemy from Checkpoint 73 with my section; I might be able to kill the lead vehicle or two. But I'm looking to do more damage than that.
I'll ask for close-in sire support from attack helos, even though this could be over before they arrive. If nothing else, they can cover my withdrawal
I’m a little late to the party on this scenario, but i’ll add my 2 cents.
I think we have lost the element of surprise. The enemy will almost certainly see fresh track marks west of the bridge and see that we have withdrawn- even on dry ground good scouts can read heavy vehicle marks. They will rightly assume ambush.
I believe the mission is best served by withdrawing to an OP and gaining intel on how they react to the assumed threat. Are they a recon element or the vanguard? Let higher up decide what action to take once more information is available.
What if these are wheeled vehicles (my assumption, like Stryker or LAV), which do not necessarily leave prominent tread marks? I agree with you though that an intelligent enemy could see the area just east of the bridge as a danger area and not drive through it, but rather may dismount and probe around the edges, the first sign of which we pull the plug and fall back looking for the next position from which we can observe. I still like the idea of giving them a chance to walk into an ambush. If they're the forward security element to something bigger, we'll learn that quickly enough when reinforcements start arriving.
All Bravo elements, this is One-Two. SPOTREP. Eight enemy light armoured vehicles (five 23mm, three 73mm) moving north on Route 12, vicinity CP 41. Speed 15 kilometres per hour. ETA CP 73 is nine mikes.
INTENT: Trap and destroy the enemy column on the bridge axis by sealing the head and tail simultaneously, forcing a zero-manoeuvre kill zone
Five-Five and Five-Seven: Maintain your positions at the base of the hills. Lock your optics onto the eastern exit of the bridge. You are the primary trigger asset. Hold fire until the lead enemy vehicle crosses the bridge and hits the east bank, then knock it out instantly to block the road.
One-Three: Move immediately north into the tree line shadow at the base of Hill +117. Maintain total noise and light discipline. Target the rear-most vehicles from the northern flank once the trigger is pulled.
One-Two (Platoon HQ): Shifting south to the eastern slope/base of Hill +108, clear of the eastern firing corridor. Maintain total defilade. Once the trigger is pulled, engage the intersection exit from the southern flank with 25mm armour-piercing.
Two-Two and Two-Three (2nd Section): Maintain positions at the base of the hills. Orient 25mm on the centre of the bridge. The moment the trap is sprung, unleash continuous high explosive and armour-piercing rounds into the trapped centre vehicles to prevent them from deploying off the sides of the bridge.
FO: Stand by to call for fire on the southern approach if any follow-on echelons appear.
Geometric Fixation: The tactical objective is the total compression of the enemy's linear movement profile into a zero-manoeuvre state. By choosing the eastern exit of the bridge as the primary obstacle and constraint point, the enemy's forward momentum is weaponised to compromise their own deployment geometry. Because the stream is easily fordable, the advancing element utilizes the bridge purely for convenience; using it as a kill box destroys their cohesion without compromising the platoon's own crossing or retrograde options later if the bridge becomes impassable.
Synchronised Kinematics:
1) Heavy kinetic energy or high-explosive rounds from the Assault Gun section execute a hard block on the lead vehicle at the eastern bridgehead. This instantaneous deceleration forms an immediate, non-negotiable physical barrier on the single-lane axis.
2) Separating 1st Section laterally; One-Three displacing north into the vegetation at the base of Hill +117 and One-Two shifting south to the base of Hill +108, completely removes friendly assets from the direct line of sight and potential overpenetration vectors of 2nd Section’s eastern baseline. This northern and southern anchoring creates a safe, cross-cutting pocket that traps the tail of the column at CP 73 without risk of fratricide.
Enfilade Exploitation: With the head and tail of the column dynamically fixed, the remaining six vehicles are restricted to a narrow, exposed bridge deck and road centreline. They cannot achieve lateral displacement or transition into defensive formations due to the stream and dense timber. 2nd Section and the AG section then exploit a high-probability, flat-trajectory enfilade corridor from the eastern low ground, systematically destroying the trapped armour via broadside engagement while sustaining zero friendly movement or exposure.
Final Note: If the advancing element goes west at CP73, we gain some intel on force composition and movement without detection and if they go east, they are erased on the water crossing.
Edit: I've been watching these scenarios for a while without participating. I'm not military and don't know 100% of the textbook terminology used, so forgive any misused phrases. My background is in civilian Security Operations and, more recently, independent research into composite ceramics for ballistic protection materials.
So, while I'm not from the tactical end of the stick per se, I tend to look at these problems through a lens of physical data, material capabilities, and geometric evidence on the map rather than rigid doctrine. For example, the briefing’s mention of a 6-wheeled 73mm platform is highly indicative of an obscure PLA design; specifically the WZ-551-1 prototype, which is essentially a Type-86 (BMP-1) turret mated to a wheeled chassis. Given the presence of that specific asset, the logical deduction for the accompanying "23mm armoured car" is the ZFB-05 4x4 light scout car.
Neither of these thin steel-skinned platforms can withstand the kinetic overmatch presented by our presumed BLUFOR lineup of LAV-25s and Stryker MGS, let alone our dismounted anti-armour assets. At a standoff under 2,000 meters for the 105mm and a point-blank 200–400 meters for our flanking 25mm broadsides, OPFOR faces immediate and total structural overpenetration. What I lack in military training I think I make up for in systems analysis.
GW86: Really glad you decided to jump in. I like the concept of trying to deny the enemy any maneuver space and the objective of ambushing him. Are you concerned that Vehicles 12 and 13 may get trapped on the wrong side of the stream. Yes, it's easily fordable, but it will probably take a minute to navigate the stream beds. Under fire, seconds could matter. Also, are you concerned about fratricide between 12 and 13, which seem to be firing directly at each other from north and south of the road.
Valid points to consider regarding the friction, John. Looking closely at the spatial constraints and terrain parameters, both risks appear structurally minimised based on probability rather than being highly likely outcomes.
First, I would like to think direct fratricide is statistically highly improbable due to the divergent diagonal vectors of the engagement sectors. One-Two is positioned south of the road axis (left of the stream), oriented North-North-East to engage the middle elements on the bridge. One-Three is positioned north of the road axis (top left of the bridge), oriented South-West to target the rear echelons near the approach. My understanding is standard vehicular SOP assumes a 25–50m gap between vehicles; their lines of fire should never intersect on a shared axis. At engagement ranges under 300 metres, the probability of stabilised 25mm systems missing the target mass by margins wide enough to threaten friendly assets is negligible. The only real threat to the other squads would be from spalling or deflections. Unless our gunners completely forget how to trace a straight line, any overpenetration backstops safely into peripheral terrain.
Second, the risk of elements becoming trapped while navigating the stream under fire is mitigated by the highly plausible compression of the enemy column. Given a bridge span of ~100m, a civilian construction profile introduces a low Military Load Classification (MLC), forcing a strict "one-at-a-time" crossing protocol to prevent structural failure (depending on the construct of the bridge, its age, etc.). This artificially stretches the column's footprint to 150m–200m. When the eastern positions neutralise Vehicle 1 at the eastern bank, the exit is physically blocked, creating an immediate accordion effect that traps Vehicle 2 on the open deck and forces Vehicles 3–8 into a static, single-file bottleneck stretching potentially halfway back to CP73.
Third, once the engagement initiates, vehicular SOP dictates the column will likely attempt to execute a herringbone stop formation to establish immediate security fields. However, given the impassable wooded boundaries flanking the road, this manoeuvre will realistically force the vehicles to pivot their hulls within the narrow road corridor. This mechanical reaction plausibly acts as a severe force multiplier for our enfilade baseline; the herringbone angling effectively exposes their vulnerable side-armour directly to our eastern riverbank positions, while simultaneously opening up clean, unobstructed lanes of fire for the Assault Guns to engage from their concealed positions in the distance.
Fourth, this enfilade effectiveness is further reinforced by the dismount scout teams from 13, 22, and 23. Their AT-4 systems operate well within their 300–400m effective range envelope against this potentially compressed, mostly static group. Given the flat trajectory at these distances and the complete absence of manoeuvring room for the OPFOR vehicles, the probability of a first-round hit is exceptionally high. While I lack a military background myself, I hold the USMC training pipeline in high regard, and our personnel should be more than capable of accurately pegging an over-sized, stationary steel box with a MANPAT at those distances without splitting the atom. The AT-4’s penetration capability introduces total lethality overmatch against the thin steel hulls of the WZ-551-1 and 4x4 platforms anyway.
Fifth, our elements possess a distinct mobility asymmetry that optimises our exfil parameter. While the western trail network presents severe tactical vulnerabilities to the south due to the oncoming Route 12 reinforcement area, our retrograde relies on a northern axis to mitigate this risk. One-Three and One-Two can break line of sight by utilising local defilade, displacing roughly 0.5km north along the western bank completely out of contact. At this distance, they can safely ford the stream, crossing over to the secure eastern bank well clear of the primary engagement pocket but still well within engagement ranges. Once across, they can utilise the established eastern bank trail to execute a clean link-up directly into the security envelope of 22 and 23. This turns the stream into a strict mobility constraint solely for OPFOR, while our assets leverage it as a protective barrier during the retrograde.
I hope that satisfies any concerns. I appreciate the pushback on the 12-13 positioning; it would be a high risk-high reward play, but I think worth the effort at the end of the day if you can take a few pieces off the chess board without needing to show all your cards with gunships or artillery.
To higher: I see 8 vehicles, five armored cars with 23mm guns, and three 6-wheeled vehicles with 73mm guns headed our direction, potentially more. They seem to be moving in a staggered column, and I think they will arrive at my platoon's position in about 10 minutes.
-If given the go-ahead to engage: Request reinforcements and air support.
To platoon: I think there are 8 vehicles, five armored cars with 23mm guns and three 6-wheeled vehicles with 73mm guns headed our direction, possibly more. They seem to be moving in a staggered column, and I think they will arrive in about 10 minutes. O/O, we will ambush the enemy force at the bridge IOT protect the battalion. Vehicles 12, fall back to vehicle 23, and vehicle 13 to vehicle 22. Vehicles 55 and 57 move 2800m from the bridge out of range of enemy weapons and engage the enemy with 90mm. Scout teams find cover in the woods in the north and south of Route 12 with AT-4s. From there, on my order, we will use the bridge as a chokepoint to bottleneck the enemy in an ambush until reinforcements arrive.
I went this way as I feel like, even if outnumbered, using the bridge as a chokepoint with the firepower we have, we should be able to hold off the enemy until reinforcements arrive. If we don't get the go-ahead to engage, then I would let it pass. However, if communications fail, I would still engage and send a runner IOT alert the battalion to the enemy position without running the risk of them finding our battalion's defensive position as they continue their movement. This reminds me of some of the situations Rommel found himself in Infantry Attacks, and his aggressiveness is what comes to mind here. However, I am new to this (OCS grad have not been to TBS yet), so let me know what you all think.
Jones,
First of all, awesome to see you in the game taking your PME seriously prior to attendance of TBS! Congratulations on graduating OCS and committing to leading Marines. It’s an awesome, difficult and extremely rewarding journey you have set on.
With regard to your orders, I have some thoughts I’d like to respectfully offer:
1st: a transmission to higher is rarely more important than generating situational awareness and tempo for your own unit. The enemy is 10 min away! Our Marines need to get moving! Higher can wait, your Marines need direction now. Consider in the future flip-flopping your priorities. Issue orders to your Marines, then report to higher.
2nd: eliminate “mother may I” mentality from your decision making cycle. There are situations where the higher commander may issue you very detailed engagement criteria which outlines when you can and cannot begin to engage the enemy. I don’t think this situation is one of them. I ask you why you included the phrase “If given the go ahead to engage”? Why do you need to clarify permission from your company commander to execute the mission you have already been assigned? What if you can’t get comms with higher in time? You are a commissioned officer, you are the leader on the deck, in the moment, with the most clear understanding of the situation. I recommend replacing “asking permission” with “relaying intentions.” The phrase “I intend to (ambush the enemy reconnaissance element)” is much stronger. It creates more ownership on your part and puts your commander in a good position where he can easily approve your actions. Execute your mission, exercise YOUR military judgement, and keep him in the loop. Generally, as long as you are executing the commander’s intent you are headed in the right direction.
3rd: it seems your plan involves ambushing the enemy at the bridge and holding him there until reinforcements arrive. I ask, does this plan align itself to the intent of your commander? You are a reconnaissance and security element who has been instructed NOT to be decisively engaged. Why do you want to hold the enemy at the bridge? We are still 10km from friendly lines. What do we gain by making a stand here? Could we accomplish your vision while also maintaining the freedom to disengage if the enemy is larger than we expect? How will your dismount scouts withdraw from their positions once their ammunition is depleted?
Hope these questions/ thoughts were at least somewhat helpful. Let me know what you think!
I agree with Apostle. In time-sensitive situations, orders first, reports later. You already have the latitude to engage the enemy as long as you don't get decisively engaged. No need for permission.
Platoon Frago: 8x enemy armored vehicles 1500m south along rte 12, moving north towards us. 5x vics with 23mm, 3x vics with 73mm
Mission: This may be the lead element of a larger enemy force. We will allow the column to pass if possible IOT observe follow-on forces, but be prepared to engage this column if they spot us
Execution:
- 2nd section: move to ambush site West of Hill 114, oriented towards route 12. Your priority is the armored cars with 23mm cannons
- AG section (main effort): come with me to ambush site in the woods vicinity of Hill 116, oriented towards route 12. Our priority is the vehicles with 73mm cannons
- Vic 13: hold security at the eastern edge of the woods to the east of Hill 116
- FO: get all the fires you can ready to hit route 12 along our kill zone
Admin:
- Do not fire unless spotted or on my order
- Our rally point is vehicle 13
To company:
Enemy recon element of about 8 armored cars is moving north on rte 12, from cp 41 to CP 73. I am setting an ambush in the vicinity of Hill 116. I intend to allow them to pass in case they are the lead element of a larger enemy force
I recommend you send the platoon to my north down to an ambush site east of me along route 12 to kill this column. I also recommend you send the attack helicopter section to scout route 12 south of CP 44 IOT find any larger enemy body
Rationale:
My initial thought was to just spring the ambush, then ford the river to the south and continue the recon down route 12. But I think that's missing the forest for the trees. The enemy has had just as much time as us to prepare an attack, and a large patrol like this coming down a major route is how it would begin. Given my mission of providing advanced warning, I'm going to let the company commander deal with this recon element while I continue to provide early warning along the most likely route of advance.
I'm setting myself up to destroy the enemy column if they spot us, but if they slip by then I can maintain observation of the bridge and CP 73. Meanwhile, if the company commander follows my recommendation, there'll be another platoon behind me to hit that enemy patrol, and an attack helicopter section moving down route 12 to find any enemy vehicles more quickly than I can.
If the company commander orders us to engage, we'll kill them quickly and rally a few hundred meters to the west. From there, I'll most likely bypass the ambush site by moving south along the eastern edge of the map, ford the stream south of the woods, and *slowly* continue my patrol. I want to get away from the burning vehicles marking my position and get eyes back on route 12 ASAP
Interesting. I'm thinking if I ambush this element and it turns out to be the advance element of something bigger, I will learn that fast enough when the main body reinforces. If you do let this element go by are you concerned that you may end up with an enemy company behind you and something bigger in front of you?
On platoon tactical net: “All stations this is 4 Actual, listen up. Enemy motorized column spotted 1500m south of CP73 moving north. Looks like scout cars in the lead followed by light armor. I can see 8 vehicles so far. I think they’re going to cross the bridge.
Mission: Platoon ambushes enemy column to delay their movement east while gaining information on enemy intentions.
Execution: we establish the kill zone on the east side of the bridge. massed surprise fires ambush against enemy reconnaissance element. I initiate ambush on lead vehicle. Assault guns destroy far targets at the bridge. Ambushing sections work targets near to far and far to near respectively. IDF isolates follow on enemy forces from the kill zone. 2nd section covers our withdrawal east along RTE 12.
2nd section: establish delaying position to cover friendly withdrawal. Reference wood line east of hill 124. Stay concealed until ambush is initiated.
AG: main effort. Establish ambush position IVO hill 116. Maintain hull defilade.
1st section: we will establish ambush position IVO hill 114. Maintain hull defilade.
Coordinating instructions:
- FO: coordinate IDF on far side of bridge to isolate enemy forces from the kill zone.
- This is going to be a quick hit and run. Scouts will not dismount. Order of withdrawal will be 1st section, then assault guns, then second section. We will work bounding over watch as needed to break contact.
- be prepared to execute follow on ambushes to delay the enemy force if needed. If we get indications that this is a larger enemy force, we will start spinning up CAS and coordinating with the adjacent platoons to get at these guys.”
Our mission is to provide intelligence and early warning of enemy action and intentions. We have an opportunity to fight for information here while also hampering the enemy’s plans.
If we successfully ambush this element and it is just a recon unit conducting a similar mission to our own, then we have damaged the enemy reconnaissance effort.
If they are the reconnaissance screen to a larger force, we will learn that quickly after engaging and uncover information about a much larger enemy movement for the friendly company and battalion to action on.
Either way, the opportunity for action is here, we stand in a very strong position if we can maintain the element of surprise, mass our fires quickly and leverage our maneuverability to quickly fade away before the enemy can grab a hold of us.
Reports to higher at this point are a nice to have, not a need to have. If we have the time, a report to higher about the current situation and our intentions (prior to ambush) is a good thing to provide our higher commanders to build their understanding of the situation. The more valuable report to make is the one that we will give after the ambush. How the enemy reacts will tell us much about their intentions, which is what our commanders really want to know
Great minds, as they say, Apostle. I like your use of IDF to isolate the objective area. I'm thinking full vehicle defilade rather than merely hull defilade. I think the enemy commander's Spider sense is likely to be tingling and he'll be scanning the high ground very closely for turrets.
Platoon: We've got a company-size enemy security detachment heading our way, vicinity Checkpoint 41 on Route 12 moving north. They'll be here in less that 10 minutes. We're going to set up an ambush east of the bridge, with a kill zone between Hill 124 on the south and Hills 114 and 116 on the north.
2nd Section: Establish vehicle defilade position vicinity eastern slope of Hill 124. Engage from the front of the column back.
Assault Guns: Establish vehicle defilade position vicinity Hill 116. Engage the 73s.
1st Section: Establishes vehicle defilade position vicinity Hill 114. Engage from the rear of the column forward.
FO: On-order linear target on Route 12 covering the kill zone.
Everybody is complete vehicle defilade until I give the order to pop and engage. Be prepared to withdraw quickly in order 2nd, 1st, AGs.
I think there's a good chance the enemy will turn east at Checkpoint 73. I want to hurt him if he does. The area east of the bridge and between the hills offers a great ambush site, although a bit tight. I'm also considering the site might appear obvious to the enemy and he might suss it out, so I'll pay careful attention to that and be ready to abort and fall back quickly if I get the sense he is not going to cooperate. I'll try to time it so that indirect fire will begin impacting in the kill zone to get the enemy to button up just before I spring the ambush.
There's also a chance the enemy will turn west at Checkpoint 73 and head back to his friendly lines, in which case I'll look for a chance to hit him in the rear.
I could engage the enemy from Checkpoint 73 with my section; I might be able to kill the lead vehicle or two. But I'm looking to do more damage than that.
I'll ask for close-in sire support from attack helos, even though this could be over before they arrive. If nothing else, they can cover my withdrawal
I’m a little late to the party on this scenario, but i’ll add my 2 cents.
I think we have lost the element of surprise. The enemy will almost certainly see fresh track marks west of the bridge and see that we have withdrawn- even on dry ground good scouts can read heavy vehicle marks. They will rightly assume ambush.
I believe the mission is best served by withdrawing to an OP and gaining intel on how they react to the assumed threat. Are they a recon element or the vanguard? Let higher up decide what action to take once more information is available.
What if these are wheeled vehicles (my assumption, like Stryker or LAV), which do not necessarily leave prominent tread marks? I agree with you though that an intelligent enemy could see the area just east of the bridge as a danger area and not drive through it, but rather may dismount and probe around the edges, the first sign of which we pull the plug and fall back looking for the next position from which we can observe. I still like the idea of giving them a chance to walk into an ambush. If they're the forward security element to something bigger, we'll learn that quickly enough when reinforcements start arriving.
All Bravo elements, this is One-Two. SPOTREP. Eight enemy light armoured vehicles (five 23mm, three 73mm) moving north on Route 12, vicinity CP 41. Speed 15 kilometres per hour. ETA CP 73 is nine mikes.
INTENT: Trap and destroy the enemy column on the bridge axis by sealing the head and tail simultaneously, forcing a zero-manoeuvre kill zone
Five-Five and Five-Seven: Maintain your positions at the base of the hills. Lock your optics onto the eastern exit of the bridge. You are the primary trigger asset. Hold fire until the lead enemy vehicle crosses the bridge and hits the east bank, then knock it out instantly to block the road.
One-Three: Move immediately north into the tree line shadow at the base of Hill +117. Maintain total noise and light discipline. Target the rear-most vehicles from the northern flank once the trigger is pulled.
One-Two (Platoon HQ): Shifting south to the eastern slope/base of Hill +108, clear of the eastern firing corridor. Maintain total defilade. Once the trigger is pulled, engage the intersection exit from the southern flank with 25mm armour-piercing.
Two-Two and Two-Three (2nd Section): Maintain positions at the base of the hills. Orient 25mm on the centre of the bridge. The moment the trap is sprung, unleash continuous high explosive and armour-piercing rounds into the trapped centre vehicles to prevent them from deploying off the sides of the bridge.
FO: Stand by to call for fire on the southern approach if any follow-on echelons appear.
Edit: moved rationale to separate comment below.
Rationale:
Geometric Fixation: The tactical objective is the total compression of the enemy's linear movement profile into a zero-manoeuvre state. By choosing the eastern exit of the bridge as the primary obstacle and constraint point, the enemy's forward momentum is weaponised to compromise their own deployment geometry. Because the stream is easily fordable, the advancing element utilizes the bridge purely for convenience; using it as a kill box destroys their cohesion without compromising the platoon's own crossing or retrograde options later if the bridge becomes impassable.
Synchronised Kinematics:
1) Heavy kinetic energy or high-explosive rounds from the Assault Gun section execute a hard block on the lead vehicle at the eastern bridgehead. This instantaneous deceleration forms an immediate, non-negotiable physical barrier on the single-lane axis.
2) Separating 1st Section laterally; One-Three displacing north into the vegetation at the base of Hill +117 and One-Two shifting south to the base of Hill +108, completely removes friendly assets from the direct line of sight and potential overpenetration vectors of 2nd Section’s eastern baseline. This northern and southern anchoring creates a safe, cross-cutting pocket that traps the tail of the column at CP 73 without risk of fratricide.
Enfilade Exploitation: With the head and tail of the column dynamically fixed, the remaining six vehicles are restricted to a narrow, exposed bridge deck and road centreline. They cannot achieve lateral displacement or transition into defensive formations due to the stream and dense timber. 2nd Section and the AG section then exploit a high-probability, flat-trajectory enfilade corridor from the eastern low ground, systematically destroying the trapped armour via broadside engagement while sustaining zero friendly movement or exposure.
Final Note: If the advancing element goes west at CP73, we gain some intel on force composition and movement without detection and if they go east, they are erased on the water crossing.
Edit: I've been watching these scenarios for a while without participating. I'm not military and don't know 100% of the textbook terminology used, so forgive any misused phrases. My background is in civilian Security Operations and, more recently, independent research into composite ceramics for ballistic protection materials.
So, while I'm not from the tactical end of the stick per se, I tend to look at these problems through a lens of physical data, material capabilities, and geometric evidence on the map rather than rigid doctrine. For example, the briefing’s mention of a 6-wheeled 73mm platform is highly indicative of an obscure PLA design; specifically the WZ-551-1 prototype, which is essentially a Type-86 (BMP-1) turret mated to a wheeled chassis. Given the presence of that specific asset, the logical deduction for the accompanying "23mm armoured car" is the ZFB-05 4x4 light scout car.
Neither of these thin steel-skinned platforms can withstand the kinetic overmatch presented by our presumed BLUFOR lineup of LAV-25s and Stryker MGS, let alone our dismounted anti-armour assets. At a standoff under 2,000 meters for the 105mm and a point-blank 200–400 meters for our flanking 25mm broadsides, OPFOR faces immediate and total structural overpenetration. What I lack in military training I think I make up for in systems analysis.
GW86: Really glad you decided to jump in. I like the concept of trying to deny the enemy any maneuver space and the objective of ambushing him. Are you concerned that Vehicles 12 and 13 may get trapped on the wrong side of the stream. Yes, it's easily fordable, but it will probably take a minute to navigate the stream beds. Under fire, seconds could matter. Also, are you concerned about fratricide between 12 and 13, which seem to be firing directly at each other from north and south of the road.
Valid points to consider regarding the friction, John. Looking closely at the spatial constraints and terrain parameters, both risks appear structurally minimised based on probability rather than being highly likely outcomes.
First, I would like to think direct fratricide is statistically highly improbable due to the divergent diagonal vectors of the engagement sectors. One-Two is positioned south of the road axis (left of the stream), oriented North-North-East to engage the middle elements on the bridge. One-Three is positioned north of the road axis (top left of the bridge), oriented South-West to target the rear echelons near the approach. My understanding is standard vehicular SOP assumes a 25–50m gap between vehicles; their lines of fire should never intersect on a shared axis. At engagement ranges under 300 metres, the probability of stabilised 25mm systems missing the target mass by margins wide enough to threaten friendly assets is negligible. The only real threat to the other squads would be from spalling or deflections. Unless our gunners completely forget how to trace a straight line, any overpenetration backstops safely into peripheral terrain.
Second, the risk of elements becoming trapped while navigating the stream under fire is mitigated by the highly plausible compression of the enemy column. Given a bridge span of ~100m, a civilian construction profile introduces a low Military Load Classification (MLC), forcing a strict "one-at-a-time" crossing protocol to prevent structural failure (depending on the construct of the bridge, its age, etc.). This artificially stretches the column's footprint to 150m–200m. When the eastern positions neutralise Vehicle 1 at the eastern bank, the exit is physically blocked, creating an immediate accordion effect that traps Vehicle 2 on the open deck and forces Vehicles 3–8 into a static, single-file bottleneck stretching potentially halfway back to CP73.
Third, once the engagement initiates, vehicular SOP dictates the column will likely attempt to execute a herringbone stop formation to establish immediate security fields. However, given the impassable wooded boundaries flanking the road, this manoeuvre will realistically force the vehicles to pivot their hulls within the narrow road corridor. This mechanical reaction plausibly acts as a severe force multiplier for our enfilade baseline; the herringbone angling effectively exposes their vulnerable side-armour directly to our eastern riverbank positions, while simultaneously opening up clean, unobstructed lanes of fire for the Assault Guns to engage from their concealed positions in the distance.
Fourth, this enfilade effectiveness is further reinforced by the dismount scout teams from 13, 22, and 23. Their AT-4 systems operate well within their 300–400m effective range envelope against this potentially compressed, mostly static group. Given the flat trajectory at these distances and the complete absence of manoeuvring room for the OPFOR vehicles, the probability of a first-round hit is exceptionally high. While I lack a military background myself, I hold the USMC training pipeline in high regard, and our personnel should be more than capable of accurately pegging an over-sized, stationary steel box with a MANPAT at those distances without splitting the atom. The AT-4’s penetration capability introduces total lethality overmatch against the thin steel hulls of the WZ-551-1 and 4x4 platforms anyway.
Fifth, our elements possess a distinct mobility asymmetry that optimises our exfil parameter. While the western trail network presents severe tactical vulnerabilities to the south due to the oncoming Route 12 reinforcement area, our retrograde relies on a northern axis to mitigate this risk. One-Three and One-Two can break line of sight by utilising local defilade, displacing roughly 0.5km north along the western bank completely out of contact. At this distance, they can safely ford the stream, crossing over to the secure eastern bank well clear of the primary engagement pocket but still well within engagement ranges. Once across, they can utilise the established eastern bank trail to execute a clean link-up directly into the security envelope of 22 and 23. This turns the stream into a strict mobility constraint solely for OPFOR, while our assets leverage it as a protective barrier during the retrograde.
I hope that satisfies any concerns. I appreciate the pushback on the 12-13 positioning; it would be a high risk-high reward play, but I think worth the effort at the end of the day if you can take a few pieces off the chess board without needing to show all your cards with gunships or artillery.