Enemy tanks and armored vehicles are advancing east on Route Cherokee!
The platoon will destroy them. Engage!
(Target assignments and engagement priorities are per SOP.)
Rationale:
• The enemy is still unaware of our presence.
• The terrain allows us to maneuver between firing positions and engage on favorable terms.
• Although the platoon is not tasked with enemy destruction, and engaging risks return fire and potentially losing our withdrawal route, we assess that the overall situation remains in our favor.
• While ideally we would let the enemy pass and engage from the flank or rear in coordination with the company main body, that introduces more uncertainty. We assess that this is the decisive moment and must be seized.
• After destroying the enemy, we will link up with the company at Checkpoint 82 and withdraw.
(It may be more advantageous for the company to remain static at 82 and ambush from prepared terrain, but this is at the discretion of the company commander.)
To platoon: “Platoon, HALT and kill your engines now. Turn to strict noise and light blackout.
Enemy armored/ mech column to our direct front on RTE Cherokee moving east toward CP82. At least 10 vics.
I don’t think they know we are here. We are going to let them pass and find another way back to friendly lines.”
To Company CO: “6, this is 1. Enemy armored/mech column approaching CP 82 along RTE Cherokee from the West. I think they are an advanced guard for a larger unit. We will not be able to make the link up without becoming decisively engaged.
Recommend that you take the rest of the company back to friendly lines without us. I intend to dismount my scouts here and post surveillance on RTE Cherokee. We will make our way back to friendly lines on our own once they’ve passed.”
To platoon: “1-2, dismount your scouts and post an OP to our North. I want eyes on RTE Cherokee to see what’s coming down the road.
Platoon, we are going to remain in blackout conditions until we assess that we have a clear lane to get back to friendly lines. The rest of the company is going to retrograde back to friendly lines. We are not equipped to take on this mech company by ourselves. Best thing we can do right now is observe and report what we are seeing to higher. Once they’ve passed, we’ll make our way back home. Turn to 100% security. This is going to be a long night.”
Our LAR battalion is out in the screen line for a reason. Higher headquarters needs a mobile, responsive unit to provide early warning and information about enemy movement and intentions.
Our task is to observe and report information and to fight in SELF PROTECTION ONLY. The division CG, the Battalion CO and our own company commander do not need a platoon biting off more than they can chew and getting destroyed by an enemy advanced guard. That does nothing for our overall SOM.
From what we understand is happening to Bravo Company, the enemy is coming in force. The best option for our platoon and for our company is to get the bulk of our combat power back to friendly lines without incident, and to get the information we can out of our fortunate and well timed placement along RTE Cherokee.
We have an opportunity to provide higher headquarters detailed information about ENY composition, disposition and strength along this route which will aid them in the coming fight.
We, as a relatively smaller unit, have the advantage of being nimble able to slip out once the enemy has passed us, although that may take several days.
Aggressive, decisive combat leaders must understand that in some instances, discretion is the better part of valor. Taking bold initiative doesn’t always mean jumping head first into the first problem you see.
Robert! That is really insightful and mature logic! If you aggressively get in over your head, get engaged, cut-off, and isolated 20 kilometers from division, then you've created a MAJOR problem. Your battalion, the division, other units, aircraft and allies, may now have to take unplanned actions to rescue YOU. People will be putting their lives on the line to make up for your rash behavior. Great job!
I like the sequence of actions here: (1) Immediate instructions to keep the platoon from being detected, (2) SALUTE report to HHQ to accomplish the mission, and (3) instructions to sections for follow-on actions. Reflects a combination of first-things-first and most-important-things-first.
Company: Enemy CRP [combat reconnaissance patrol] heading southwest on Cherokee approaching the Cherokee-Apache intersection, grid 123456. I count 8 tanks, 4 IFVs. I am cut of and will not make the RP. I intend to cross behind and find another crossing site further north and find my way back.
Platoon: Listen up. We're cut off. That's an enemy CRP passing below us, with an advance guardto follow. We're gonna try to shoot the gap between them and cross Cherokee heading north. We'll find another crossing site further north. We MAY engage the CRP from the rear as we pass, IF I think we can do that without getting decisively engaged. Order of march is 1st Section, ATs, 2nd Section. 1st is oriented RIGHT on the CRP. 2nd is oriented LEFT looking out for the advance guard. ATs ready to swing either direction. Engage on my command only. When we move we're gonna move fast.
Rationale: My mission is to provide information, so I make my report to HHQ. Once I do that, my main objective is to get my platoon back to friendly lines. I'm instructed not to get decisively engaged. I don't think I can take on this enemy element without getting decisively engaged, especially as I believe there is a larger enemy force following not far behind. There seems to be a large enemy attack underway. So what I think I am looking at is a combat reconnaissance patrol, which I would expect to be followed by an advance guard battalion. Bravo is already engaged to the south, so my initial plan (which could change) is that we'll cross north between the CRP and the advance guard. That will depend on time and space, and I'll make that call in the moment. I don't know what the situation is further north. Maybe I can link up wit C Company at Navaho Crossing. Also, it looks like there are some small crossing sites between here and Navaho. If I don't think I have the time and space to shoot the gap, I'll come up with another plan. This is a fluid situation, and I'll be coordinating with Company the whole time.
I believe the main effort of an enemy force is to our north.
Command section to maneuver 200m east and report enemy progress along route Cherokee to higher in order to warn our Division.
AT section to cover road coming up from route Cherokee and engage any enemy vehicles coming toward our position in order to cover our withdrawal.
Second section move 500m south to ensure alternate route (Iroquois) is clear in order to secure our route of extraction.
Actions on contact: proceed to route Iroquois and east to division rally point.
Logic: Presence of a tank company is a big problem. This is not a recon element. Likely the routes to the north are compromised and the enemy has penetrated the friendly screen and is to our northeast. Best course is to extract via Iroquois and rendezvous with Division that way. Engaging risks losing access to an escape route and destruction.
Why is this column the enemy's main effort? I didn't see it that way. Only in the poverty-stricken U.S. Marine Corps do we consider six tanks a "significant force." In every other mechanized army in the world, this is likely a lieutenant's combat reconnaissance patrol (CRP). The REAL problem is the 52 tanks of the follow-on battalion!
The ratio of tanks to other types of vehicles does not indicate a recon element. This obviously is not the entire main effort but the composition should put everyone on high alert time is short. We are agreeing on the 54 problem. I’m suggesting this is part of that 54.
Platoon: Enemy tank/mech company on Route Apache to my front/left; range close! Soon they'll cut us off from the RP. We attack by fire to disrupt their advance, then we'll withdraw back the way we came.
My vehicle is base unit. I'm engaging lead vehicles.
Bravo Section: deploy to my left & attack by fire middle of their column. Break contact when I do.
AT Section: deploy behind us; keep enemy from pursuing our withdrawal.
To Company Commander: Enemy Tank/Mech Company moving south east on Rte Cherokee towards you; about 4km west of RP. I'm engaging then moving southwest; will find alternate route to link up.
In some ways this situation is suboptimal. I'm definitely not going to cruise down Rte Cherokee and link up with my company anytime soon.
On the other hand, I get do conduct a classic LAR mission my providing early warning to my company. In this case, it's going to be a very aggressive early warning.
I'm assuming that the steep 25' drop off provides an advantage in that my 25mm guns can hit the relatively thin top armor of the tanks & IFVs. Even if I can't get K-kills, I can surely "ring their bells" and disrupt their movement. I intend to hit them hard with a few dozen shots from each of my LAV-25s, then withdraw back the way I came. If they follow me, that's great. I left my AT's behind for a few reasons. (1) If ENY pursues me, they'll get hit by TOWs as they come up the trail in single file. (2) TOWs are tough to reload and are a limited resource, so I may need these assets later. (3) I likely have many hours of maneuvering ahead of me and need to avoid becoming decisively engaged. (4) My platoon's IA drills cover what we're doing here (at night, quickly) and adding two more vehicles to the mix could be confusing and delay my withdrawal.
Overall, I think I can strike a blow that slows and confuses the enemy, thereby buying time for my Company to organize their defense. I can do so without becoming decisively engaged, thus remaining within Commander's Intent.
You certainly are being more aggressive than I chose to be, but you make a reasoned argument for your concept of ops. What's your thinking about how you eventually get back. My concern was that if I do not find a way across the wadi quickly, all the crossing sites will soon belong tot he enemy and I will be completely trapped.
Yeah, getting back home could be a problem. My thought when completing the problem was, "I'll have to find an unproven route across the wadi rather than risk one of the main routes." I guess that's the scouts are for! Obviously, this isn't the strongest aspect of my plan but I'm not sure we can count on the northern crossing to be open either.
Agree with all. I wouldn't count on Navaho Crossing being open either, but I keep it in mind as an option, although I consider an unimproved crossing more likely.
I like your "very aggressive early warning" sentence. Why just radio when can shoot AND radio? An unsure enemy CRP that over-estimates your size (based on your aggressiveness) might stop and delay here for hours.
Situation: Tanks and APCs direct front, they don’t see us, hold fire! I think the enemy is launching a major offensive to seize the crossing sites over Wadi Kabir.
Mission: We need to ambush the enemy armored column IOT buy time for the main force to respond to the attack.
CONOPS: Hasty ambush from the escarpment into the rear/right flank of the column. My section is the left guide, AT section in the middle, 2d Section takes right. We move now.
Tasks:
1st Section: SE2, Ambush rear of the column IOT prevent enemy escape from killzone.
AT Section: SE1 Destroy as many of those tanks as you can IOT prevent enemy armor from reaching the main battle area. Target precedence is TANKS, APCs.
2d Section: ME, Ambush front of the column IOT prevent enemy reaching Wadi Kabir. Gum up that road!
Coordinating Instructions:
I will initiate the ambush with main gun.
Break contact battle drill by section, we need to stay alive to re-engage these guys further down the track.
1st Platoon: You got 8-12 Tanks/APCs headed your way. I’m engaging 4KM west of your position.
Rationale: We need to act now. Our mission has changed. This is a major offensive to seize the crossing points on Wadi Kabir. As much as I want to ambush these guys when they are vulnerable on the crossing site, that means trailing them for several KMs. There is a good chance micro-terrain forces us to break contact between here and there. Or worse: one of his guys spots us and we lose the initiative. We have eyes on now, this is my best opportunity to impact these guys. I'll let section leaders break contact on their own initiative once we spring the ambush, we need to try to stay alive so we can regain contact with the enemy IOT support higher HQ.
After only one day, "Cherokee Crossing" has already turned into a really interesting scenario with a surprisingly wide range of situational assessments, interpretations of mission, and courses of action posted. I was worried when I wrote it that it posed a relatively uninteresting challenge. Reading the other solutions has got me wondering if I'm getting wiser in my old age or more risk-averse.
I think we may have to explore this situation further with a follow-on scenario.
I am also surprised by the range of COAs. I think some of the schemes people have crafted to take a bite out of this column are clever, but I think this scenario definitely deserves a more detailed discussion on how commanders can seek to determine if the present situation has changed their orders.
In my opinion, this is a scenario where the developing situation hasn’t changed how I understand my mission.
Hiro Katsura has pointed out that the scenario describes the enemy formation as "10-12 tanks and infantry fighting vehicles," but the SALUTE report in my solution specifies 8 tanks and 4 IFVs. I did this only to provide a more complete SALUTE report, figuring that after studying the enemy to make the report, I would probably be able to distinguish tanks from IFVs. But as I think about it, it could matter in the decision about whether to try to ambush (which Hiro did and I didn't). My tank killers are my TOWs, of which I can launch only 4 in each salvo. IF there are only 4 tanks, and IF I get a kill with each shot, problem solved. But if there are 8 tanks, it will take me at least two complete salvos with reloads in between--if I get 100% kills. As TOWs are not a rapid-fire system by any means, that's a problem. We match up better against 4 tanks and 8 IFVs than against 8 and 4.
But I'm betting on the dirt. I remember driving off Route Cherokee and up onto route Apache 48 hours ago. The draw from the high ground down to Route Cherokee is steep and narrow. This is a perfect keyhole ambush position. My AT vehicles will engage only one or two tanks at a time, inching forward to open the aperture and engage more enemies only when ready. The remainder of the enemy column, overwatching their lead vehicles, will have no visibility on me (tucked into the draw), and no ability to return fire.
Radio: "Head's up! We're going to ambush a dozen enemy tanks on the road below! They don't see us yet."
1.S. "There's 12 tanks and IFVs, moving left to right in front of us, heading east toward Division. Another column, 10 km (S), is also moving toward Division. Our battalion provides early warning of these probing attacks. I think more enemy armor will follow the most successful probe."
2.M. "In ten minutes, our platoon attacks by fire, destroying the column in front of us, in order to protect the Division's west flank."
3.E. "CONOPS. Two sections use the protection of the draw to engage the enemy at 1000 meters. One section secures our left flank. Fires: None. I will call for CAS.
"Tasks. AT Section. ME. Attack by fire to destroy the tanks in order to protect Division (W) flank.
1 Section. Attack by fire to destroy IFVs in order to prevent enemy counterattack.
2 Section. Secure our left flank in order to prevent an enemy dismounted flank attack."
"Coordinating Instructions. BPT WTH (SE) to cross Wadi Kabir (S) of Cherokee crossing.
I'm recommending a company block at Cherokee Crossing. Route Cherokee is the CFL if any CAS arrives. Anything north of the highway is enemy."
"Let's move!"
Rationale:
- This is not rash, it's a fleeting opportunity. I could withdraw to the Company position (and maybe the Company CO would want that), but the opportunity to be decisive is now, the terrain is here, and the surprise will be short-lived.
- With 16 missiles each, our two AT vehicles should inflict serious damage on the enemy.
- Enemy tank lethality is ideally blunted by defilade terrain. If we are fortunate, the draw will have a steep left bank to protect us from return fire from the rear of the enemy column.
- Dismounted infantry is a threat, but they will need to climb the embankment to flank us from the north.
How would you withdraw to the company position? Based on what we know from the map, you have been cut off from the only withdrawal route to the wadi. Or are you assuming there is access to the wadi further south before you get to Iroquois Xing, which we know if a no-go? 32 TOW missiles, yes, but what's the rate of fire?
Enemy tanks and armored vehicles are advancing east on Route Cherokee!
The platoon will destroy them. Engage!
(Target assignments and engagement priorities are per SOP.)
Rationale:
• The enemy is still unaware of our presence.
• The terrain allows us to maneuver between firing positions and engage on favorable terms.
• Although the platoon is not tasked with enemy destruction, and engaging risks return fire and potentially losing our withdrawal route, we assess that the overall situation remains in our favor.
• While ideally we would let the enemy pass and engage from the flank or rear in coordination with the company main body, that introduces more uncertainty. We assess that this is the decisive moment and must be seized.
• After destroying the enemy, we will link up with the company at Checkpoint 82 and withdraw.
(It may be more advantageous for the company to remain static at 82 and ambush from prepared terrain, but this is at the discretion of the company commander.)
To platoon: “Platoon, HALT and kill your engines now. Turn to strict noise and light blackout.
Enemy armored/ mech column to our direct front on RTE Cherokee moving east toward CP82. At least 10 vics.
I don’t think they know we are here. We are going to let them pass and find another way back to friendly lines.”
To Company CO: “6, this is 1. Enemy armored/mech column approaching CP 82 along RTE Cherokee from the West. I think they are an advanced guard for a larger unit. We will not be able to make the link up without becoming decisively engaged.
Recommend that you take the rest of the company back to friendly lines without us. I intend to dismount my scouts here and post surveillance on RTE Cherokee. We will make our way back to friendly lines on our own once they’ve passed.”
To platoon: “1-2, dismount your scouts and post an OP to our North. I want eyes on RTE Cherokee to see what’s coming down the road.
Platoon, we are going to remain in blackout conditions until we assess that we have a clear lane to get back to friendly lines. The rest of the company is going to retrograde back to friendly lines. We are not equipped to take on this mech company by ourselves. Best thing we can do right now is observe and report what we are seeing to higher. Once they’ve passed, we’ll make our way back home. Turn to 100% security. This is going to be a long night.”
Rationale:
Our LAR battalion is out in the screen line for a reason. Higher headquarters needs a mobile, responsive unit to provide early warning and information about enemy movement and intentions.
Our task is to observe and report information and to fight in SELF PROTECTION ONLY. The division CG, the Battalion CO and our own company commander do not need a platoon biting off more than they can chew and getting destroyed by an enemy advanced guard. That does nothing for our overall SOM.
From what we understand is happening to Bravo Company, the enemy is coming in force. The best option for our platoon and for our company is to get the bulk of our combat power back to friendly lines without incident, and to get the information we can out of our fortunate and well timed placement along RTE Cherokee.
We have an opportunity to provide higher headquarters detailed information about ENY composition, disposition and strength along this route which will aid them in the coming fight.
We, as a relatively smaller unit, have the advantage of being nimble able to slip out once the enemy has passed us, although that may take several days.
Aggressive, decisive combat leaders must understand that in some instances, discretion is the better part of valor. Taking bold initiative doesn’t always mean jumping head first into the first problem you see.
Robert! That is really insightful and mature logic! If you aggressively get in over your head, get engaged, cut-off, and isolated 20 kilometers from division, then you've created a MAJOR problem. Your battalion, the division, other units, aircraft and allies, may now have to take unplanned actions to rescue YOU. People will be putting their lives on the line to make up for your rash behavior. Great job!
I like the sequence of actions here: (1) Immediate instructions to keep the platoon from being detected, (2) SALUTE report to HHQ to accomplish the mission, and (3) instructions to sections for follow-on actions. Reflects a combination of first-things-first and most-important-things-first.
Company: Enemy CRP [combat reconnaissance patrol] heading southwest on Cherokee approaching the Cherokee-Apache intersection, grid 123456. I count 8 tanks, 4 IFVs. I am cut of and will not make the RP. I intend to cross behind and find another crossing site further north and find my way back.
Platoon: Listen up. We're cut off. That's an enemy CRP passing below us, with an advance guardto follow. We're gonna try to shoot the gap between them and cross Cherokee heading north. We'll find another crossing site further north. We MAY engage the CRP from the rear as we pass, IF I think we can do that without getting decisively engaged. Order of march is 1st Section, ATs, 2nd Section. 1st is oriented RIGHT on the CRP. 2nd is oriented LEFT looking out for the advance guard. ATs ready to swing either direction. Engage on my command only. When we move we're gonna move fast.
Rationale: My mission is to provide information, so I make my report to HHQ. Once I do that, my main objective is to get my platoon back to friendly lines. I'm instructed not to get decisively engaged. I don't think I can take on this enemy element without getting decisively engaged, especially as I believe there is a larger enemy force following not far behind. There seems to be a large enemy attack underway. So what I think I am looking at is a combat reconnaissance patrol, which I would expect to be followed by an advance guard battalion. Bravo is already engaged to the south, so my initial plan (which could change) is that we'll cross north between the CRP and the advance guard. That will depend on time and space, and I'll make that call in the moment. I don't know what the situation is further north. Maybe I can link up wit C Company at Navaho Crossing. Also, it looks like there are some small crossing sites between here and Navaho. If I don't think I have the time and space to shoot the gap, I'll come up with another plan. This is a fluid situation, and I'll be coordinating with Company the whole time.
I believe the main effort of an enemy force is to our north.
Command section to maneuver 200m east and report enemy progress along route Cherokee to higher in order to warn our Division.
AT section to cover road coming up from route Cherokee and engage any enemy vehicles coming toward our position in order to cover our withdrawal.
Second section move 500m south to ensure alternate route (Iroquois) is clear in order to secure our route of extraction.
Actions on contact: proceed to route Iroquois and east to division rally point.
Logic: Presence of a tank company is a big problem. This is not a recon element. Likely the routes to the north are compromised and the enemy has penetrated the friendly screen and is to our northeast. Best course is to extract via Iroquois and rendezvous with Division that way. Engaging risks losing access to an escape route and destruction.
Why is this column the enemy's main effort? I didn't see it that way. Only in the poverty-stricken U.S. Marine Corps do we consider six tanks a "significant force." In every other mechanized army in the world, this is likely a lieutenant's combat reconnaissance patrol (CRP). The REAL problem is the 52 tanks of the follow-on battalion!
The ratio of tanks to other types of vehicles does not indicate a recon element. This obviously is not the entire main effort but the composition should put everyone on high alert time is short. We are agreeing on the 54 problem. I’m suggesting this is part of that 54.
Platoon: Enemy tank/mech company on Route Apache to my front/left; range close! Soon they'll cut us off from the RP. We attack by fire to disrupt their advance, then we'll withdraw back the way we came.
My vehicle is base unit. I'm engaging lead vehicles.
Bravo Section: deploy to my left & attack by fire middle of their column. Break contact when I do.
AT Section: deploy behind us; keep enemy from pursuing our withdrawal.
To Company Commander: Enemy Tank/Mech Company moving south east on Rte Cherokee towards you; about 4km west of RP. I'm engaging then moving southwest; will find alternate route to link up.
In some ways this situation is suboptimal. I'm definitely not going to cruise down Rte Cherokee and link up with my company anytime soon.
On the other hand, I get do conduct a classic LAR mission my providing early warning to my company. In this case, it's going to be a very aggressive early warning.
I'm assuming that the steep 25' drop off provides an advantage in that my 25mm guns can hit the relatively thin top armor of the tanks & IFVs. Even if I can't get K-kills, I can surely "ring their bells" and disrupt their movement. I intend to hit them hard with a few dozen shots from each of my LAV-25s, then withdraw back the way I came. If they follow me, that's great. I left my AT's behind for a few reasons. (1) If ENY pursues me, they'll get hit by TOWs as they come up the trail in single file. (2) TOWs are tough to reload and are a limited resource, so I may need these assets later. (3) I likely have many hours of maneuvering ahead of me and need to avoid becoming decisively engaged. (4) My platoon's IA drills cover what we're doing here (at night, quickly) and adding two more vehicles to the mix could be confusing and delay my withdrawal.
Overall, I think I can strike a blow that slows and confuses the enemy, thereby buying time for my Company to organize their defense. I can do so without becoming decisively engaged, thus remaining within Commander's Intent.
You certainly are being more aggressive than I chose to be, but you make a reasoned argument for your concept of ops. What's your thinking about how you eventually get back. My concern was that if I do not find a way across the wadi quickly, all the crossing sites will soon belong tot he enemy and I will be completely trapped.
Yeah, getting back home could be a problem. My thought when completing the problem was, "I'll have to find an unproven route across the wadi rather than risk one of the main routes." I guess that's the scouts are for! Obviously, this isn't the strongest aspect of my plan but I'm not sure we can count on the northern crossing to be open either.
Agree with all. I wouldn't count on Navaho Crossing being open either, but I keep it in mind as an option, although I consider an unimproved crossing more likely.
I like your "very aggressive early warning" sentence. Why just radio when can shoot AND radio? An unsure enemy CRP that over-estimates your size (based on your aggressiveness) might stop and delay here for hours.
Situation: Tanks and APCs direct front, they don’t see us, hold fire! I think the enemy is launching a major offensive to seize the crossing sites over Wadi Kabir.
Mission: We need to ambush the enemy armored column IOT buy time for the main force to respond to the attack.
CONOPS: Hasty ambush from the escarpment into the rear/right flank of the column. My section is the left guide, AT section in the middle, 2d Section takes right. We move now.
Tasks:
1st Section: SE2, Ambush rear of the column IOT prevent enemy escape from killzone.
AT Section: SE1 Destroy as many of those tanks as you can IOT prevent enemy armor from reaching the main battle area. Target precedence is TANKS, APCs.
2d Section: ME, Ambush front of the column IOT prevent enemy reaching Wadi Kabir. Gum up that road!
Coordinating Instructions:
I will initiate the ambush with main gun.
Break contact battle drill by section, we need to stay alive to re-engage these guys further down the track.
1st Platoon: You got 8-12 Tanks/APCs headed your way. I’m engaging 4KM west of your position.
Rationale: We need to act now. Our mission has changed. This is a major offensive to seize the crossing points on Wadi Kabir. As much as I want to ambush these guys when they are vulnerable on the crossing site, that means trailing them for several KMs. There is a good chance micro-terrain forces us to break contact between here and there. Or worse: one of his guys spots us and we lose the initiative. We have eyes on now, this is my best opportunity to impact these guys. I'll let section leaders break contact on their own initiative once we spring the ambush, we need to try to stay alive so we can regain contact with the enemy IOT support higher HQ.
After only one day, "Cherokee Crossing" has already turned into a really interesting scenario with a surprisingly wide range of situational assessments, interpretations of mission, and courses of action posted. I was worried when I wrote it that it posed a relatively uninteresting challenge. Reading the other solutions has got me wondering if I'm getting wiser in my old age or more risk-averse.
I think we may have to explore this situation further with a follow-on scenario.
Thoughts?
I am also surprised by the range of COAs. I think some of the schemes people have crafted to take a bite out of this column are clever, but I think this scenario definitely deserves a more detailed discussion on how commanders can seek to determine if the present situation has changed their orders.
In my opinion, this is a scenario where the developing situation hasn’t changed how I understand my mission.
Platoon! Orient northeast. Enemy armored vehicles moving east, towards Wadi Kabir.
I will fire upon them as the approach Wadi Kabir.
Let them pass, then attack them by fire. Do not close.
Company! Enemy column blocks my route. I will attack them by fire. Request indirect fire/air strike on intersection of Wadi Kabir and Route Cherokee.
Hiro Katsura has pointed out that the scenario describes the enemy formation as "10-12 tanks and infantry fighting vehicles," but the SALUTE report in my solution specifies 8 tanks and 4 IFVs. I did this only to provide a more complete SALUTE report, figuring that after studying the enemy to make the report, I would probably be able to distinguish tanks from IFVs. But as I think about it, it could matter in the decision about whether to try to ambush (which Hiro did and I didn't). My tank killers are my TOWs, of which I can launch only 4 in each salvo. IF there are only 4 tanks, and IF I get a kill with each shot, problem solved. But if there are 8 tanks, it will take me at least two complete salvos with reloads in between--if I get 100% kills. As TOWs are not a rapid-fire system by any means, that's a problem. We match up better against 4 tanks and 8 IFVs than against 8 and 4.
But I'm betting on the dirt. I remember driving off Route Cherokee and up onto route Apache 48 hours ago. The draw from the high ground down to Route Cherokee is steep and narrow. This is a perfect keyhole ambush position. My AT vehicles will engage only one or two tanks at a time, inching forward to open the aperture and engage more enemies only when ready. The remainder of the enemy column, overwatching their lead vehicles, will have no visibility on me (tucked into the draw), and no ability to return fire.
Radio: "Head's up! We're going to ambush a dozen enemy tanks on the road below! They don't see us yet."
1.S. "There's 12 tanks and IFVs, moving left to right in front of us, heading east toward Division. Another column, 10 km (S), is also moving toward Division. Our battalion provides early warning of these probing attacks. I think more enemy armor will follow the most successful probe."
2.M. "In ten minutes, our platoon attacks by fire, destroying the column in front of us, in order to protect the Division's west flank."
3.E. "CONOPS. Two sections use the protection of the draw to engage the enemy at 1000 meters. One section secures our left flank. Fires: None. I will call for CAS.
"Tasks. AT Section. ME. Attack by fire to destroy the tanks in order to protect Division (W) flank.
1 Section. Attack by fire to destroy IFVs in order to prevent enemy counterattack.
2 Section. Secure our left flank in order to prevent an enemy dismounted flank attack."
"Coordinating Instructions. BPT WTH (SE) to cross Wadi Kabir (S) of Cherokee crossing.
I'm recommending a company block at Cherokee Crossing. Route Cherokee is the CFL if any CAS arrives. Anything north of the highway is enemy."
"Let's move!"
Rationale:
- This is not rash, it's a fleeting opportunity. I could withdraw to the Company position (and maybe the Company CO would want that), but the opportunity to be decisive is now, the terrain is here, and the surprise will be short-lived.
- With 16 missiles each, our two AT vehicles should inflict serious damage on the enemy.
- Enemy tank lethality is ideally blunted by defilade terrain. If we are fortunate, the draw will have a steep left bank to protect us from return fire from the rear of the enemy column.
- Dismounted infantry is a threat, but they will need to climb the embankment to flank us from the north.
How would you withdraw to the company position? Based on what we know from the map, you have been cut off from the only withdrawal route to the wadi. Or are you assuming there is access to the wadi further south before you get to Iroquois Xing, which we know if a no-go? 32 TOW missiles, yes, but what's the rate of fire?