'71 Company of Host Nation Forces has occupied Eot'b'.
'I am not sure why it is there. It's supposed to be ten clicks to the west. It may have been defeated by enemy forces. It may also have changed sides'.
'I am going to investigate in person. D Company (Robots) and A Company (Tanks) come with me. As I approach Eot'b, take up positions that allow you to fire upon the forces in the town.'
'I will enter the town on foot, carrying a flag of truce'.
'If I am captured or killed, XO will take command, attack the town, and continue the original mission.'
Rationale
A 'Blue on Green' battle, especially one on a large scale, will do a great deal of damage to the coalition that we are in. Thus, rather than simply attacking - which I would otherwise do - I will bet my life on the continued loyalty of 71 Company.
I'm genuinely curious: why are you exposing the battalion commander, in an already uncertain situation, at night, to either an ally who's trigger happy and has already misidentified you, or an enemy who will likely fire again on anyone approaching their position?
Also, say it is the 71st after all, but they still mistakenly identify you and kill you - your last standing order will be to the XO to assume command and attack the town, instigating the Blue on Green battle you want to avoid. Why not use an alternate method to gain positive ID on whatever units are in Eotb without exposing yourself or further risking Green on Blue?
Our attempts to get positive ID by other means have already failed.
If the 71st is teetering between loyalty and treason, a show of personal courage may tip the balance in our favor. Likewise, if the 71st was, in fact, defeated, such a demonstration will help me rally them. Finally, I expect to negotiate with the man currently in charge of the 71st, and such negotiations can only be conducted face-to-face.
All companies, our scouts are taking fire from forces east of checkpoint 21. FRAGO follows:
Bravo Company, shift north to join up with our scouts and establish a defensive position on the eastern side of dune Golf. Send dismounts with ATGMs to the crest of the dune to observe and report on troop dispositions in the vicinity of checkpoint 21. Send one platoon further north around the flank of dune Fox to establish observation up and down Route Keuka. All Bravo platoons, weapons hold.
Charlie Company, shift south, have platoons establish defensive positions to the northern and southern flanks of dune Alpha, with the southern platoon observing Route Keuka and northern platoon reporting identification on units in the vicinity of checkpoint 21. Send dismounts to the crest of Alpha with the same instructions as I just gave Bravo Company. Weapons hold.
Delta Company, move around Alpha Company as rapidly as possible to the location our scouts reported contact, utilize your Alpha Tango Romeo systems to attempt identification on those forces that fired on our scouts and report their determination as soon as possible. Weapons hold.
Alpha Company, spread out behind Delta Company oriented west toward checkpoint 21 and be prepared to drive west to support Delta Company if needed. Weapons hold.
All companies, report identification of any units observed near checkpoint 21 immediately. Go.
Rationale: I suspect this may be a case of possible fratricide from our host nation advance unit, but want to be prepared in case this is in fact an enemy advance and the 71st Company got overrun without being able to tell us. With Bravo I want to reinforce my damaged scouts, get dismounts onto the dune to fire on Eotb if needed, but also get eyes on Route Keuka in the direction of our main attack to see if the enemy is potentially advancing into the flank of our attack. If so, Division needs to be warned. I want Charlie to cover my southern flank and put Eotb into a crossfire if needed.
My robots have ATR and no humans aboard - I'm willing to risk them in order to leverage their ATR and figure out if I have the 71st Company in front of me or not. If it's the 71st, I'd rather lose a robot to fratricide while I work out an alternate signal plan to get them to stop firing at me. If it's the enemy, then my robots can blunt their further advance while my tanks come up from behind, and Bravo and Charlie start firing on the enemy from the flanks. Yes, my tanks might be firing through the line of my robots, but I'd prefer to keep my tanks near the road where they can maneuver better than having them drive around sand dunes and again, they're robots. They're expendable, but I'm assuming my tank gunners wait to get solid shots on the enemy rather than shooting my own robots. My robots can capture the enemy's attention while my tanks maneuver behind to cause more damage.
Everyone is weapons hold because I'm not going to compound possible fratricide by the 71st Company on me by committing fratricide back on them with overly loose ROE.
Also, I see we're continuing the valiant effort started in the Cherokee Crossing TDG...
Ian. You're killing me. I read the first paragraph as if I was the "B" Company Commander. After reading the ten(!) micromanagement tasks you issued to me, I still have no idea of the ONE task I'm supposed to accomplish, or how that task fits into the larger plan. What is my single overall task and purpose? What exactly do you want me to do?
"shift north..." [That means 'move,' right?]
"join up..." [Join? Is he attached to me? Do we have the same task?]
"establish... position on the east side of dune Golf..." [For what purpose?]
"send dismounts with ATGMs..." [Micromanagement. I'll decide who goes]
"to the crest..." [Unnecessary.]
"observe and report..." [Unnecessary.]
"send one platoon..." [Micromanagement.]
"all Bravo platoons... [Micromanagement. I'll issue the orders to my platoons.]
"weapons hold..." [Do I need your permission to shoot the enemy?]
The other company commanders and I are all competent leaders. You do not have to move us like puppets. "Alpha Company... spread out... orient west... drive west..."
So some of this seems to be arguing over semantics. “Shift” vs “move” north—it’s a happy to glad distinction, which I would think the company commander understands either way as “I want you to go north.”
As to the level of detail, like I said in the rationale, I see this as a very fraught moment. This could be fratricide, this could be enemy to my front. Each one of my orders to the companies carries the underlying message of: identify what’s in front, and do not be loose with fires and make a potentially bad fratricidal situation worse.
As commander, I’ll damn well decide weapons conditions for my subordinate units if I think a more restrictive ROE is needed. Weapons hold does not restrict self-defense; but I want ID on what is in front us and my weapons conditions makes that clear. And I’m sending my human units to places where I think the risk of them getting mistakenly fired on is less; I’m sending my robots where the odds of getting fired on are certainly greater, because fires have already occurred, but I would take a dead robot due to friendly fire that I can then disentangle with my ally, if that’s who it is, over friendly fire that gets Marines killed.
I see a few interesting thoughts embedded here: (1) "I'm sending my human units to places where I think the risk of them getting mistakenly fired on is less." A rationale for the employment of robotics I have not heard before. (2) Leveraging the ATR capability of autonomous systems to determine friend or foe by sending them directly into harm's way. (3) Putting dismounted infantry on the ridges around Eot'b essentially commits to a positional fight there and limits opportunities for maneuver elsewhere (I'm thinking against the crossing)-- unless you're thinking of leaving the dismounted infantry in place and maneuvering with vehicles only.
WRT Brendan's comments, at a minimum I think we can all agree that an example of a mission-type order this is not.
So I will offer that we are crafting orders based on our backgrounds. You’re thinking like ground leaders, which makes sense unless Vinton has some flight time he’s forgotten to tell me about. I’m thinking like an aviator, and the lesson pounded into our heads is: be directive, then descriptive. To take an extreme example: following the purest understanding of mission-type orders, were I to see a SAM launched at an aircraft in my section, if I start with “Tiger 20, my intent is that you avoid the missile coming at you, take evasive action—“ Tiger 20 is dead before I get past “my intent.” My actual order to Tiger 20 would be “20, break right, pop chaff and flares, SAM at your 5 o’clock low.” My intent is implicit in the directive I give: I want Tiger 20 to not get hit by the missile.
All my orders to my maneuver units here are directive, then descriptive. I want movement and disposition first. Implicit in each directive is that I want to ID what’s in front of us, and I do not want to accidentally shoot allied forces. We have 5 minutes to think and deliver our orders; look at my timers below, and I think we can all get to the “why” after the first minute or so of saying “what.”
I’ll admit that my level of detail to platoon maneuver may seem excessive, but I will again offer based on my background, if I were briefing a large flight of aircraft, I would go into high levels of detail on where I want aircraft to land, where I want weapons pointed, what target reference points are, what weapons and survivability gear conditions we will be at, because the last thing I want confusion about is whether at night, dash 7 is supposed to be echelon left or echelon right behind dash 6 in the LZ. A battalion CO directing platoon employment? OK, I’ll admit I don’t have the experience in that department to know if that’s non-standard. A squadron CO—also an O5 commander—telling each and every aircraft where and when he wants it during a flight brief? Absolutely nothing unusual in that in my (former) world.
If a part of mission-type orders is expeditious delivery of instructions, then here’s what our respective orders timed out at when I read them out loud:
Brendan: 1 minute 9 seconds
John: 1 minute 12 seconds
Vinton: 53 seconds, kudos to you for coming in under a minute
My orders: 1 minute 14 seconds
Yes, I went into greater detail. It took me 2 seconds longer than the next guy.
One more digression on aviation orders/tasking and then I’ll shut up about it. Well, one digression with two anecdotes. Anecdote 1: I had a conversation with Chad Skaggs like 7 or 8 years ago when we were working together in the Warfighting Society, and we were comparing experiences on whether maneuver warfare was truly practiced anywhere in the Marine Corps. My assumption was that ground units were more maneuverist since maneuver warfare has a heavy ground flavor, and NCOs have greater levels of tactical authority than their aviation equivalents. I also assumed ground units studied, or least gave lip service to, actual doctrine like MCDP-1, because core doctrine was certainly never a topic of discussion in the squadron ready room. I figured Chad, being with LAR, was super-maneuvery since a recon unit would have to be, right? He surprised me by saying he felt constantly micromanaged when in the field, always having to stop every 10 minutes to deliver some update to higher, or with higher stepping in on him based on false levels of SA provided by UAS or BFT. He felt frustrated at not being able to practice maneuver warfare, despite talking about it.
I compared that to my aviation world, where like I said, no one’s cracking open MCDP-1 in the ready room. But comparing my practical experiences to his, I felt like I was highly maneuverist in execution. If I was taking a section of aircraft “over the hill” from Miramar—leaving Miramar to enter the Yuma training area—once I was out of line-of-sight comms with our squadron duty officer, I was on my own. I had the mission I’d briefed in the ready room, but I had full authority to call audibles on how we executed training, adjust timelines and routes, and modify or cancel things entirely if in my judgment it was necessary to do so. If I had a cell phone signal in the training area, I might text the duty officer to brief them on my decisions to change or cancel things. If I didn’t have a cell phone signal, then the first inkling the CO would get that I’d changed the plan was when I got back over the hill with line-of-sight comms and told the duty officer I was 20 minutes out, I’d modified or cancelled for reason XYZ, and I’d provide full details when we landed. And this wasn’t just in a training environment—in Iraq and Afghanistan, there were wide swathes of desert where we had comms with virtually no one, and so if I had to execute changes based on commander’s intent from the original brief, I just did it. I’m conscious of only one occasion where, when I got back, the squadron XO questioned me on why a mission had not gone as planned; we spent more time on the deck at Dwyer than we were scheduled to. I told him it was because the ADACG had begun using a new type of cargo container that was flimsier than the old one; hadn’t alerted us to the changes; and so our crew chiefs were trying to figure out how to properly load crappy tri-walls that kept collapsing on them when stacked. The XO took the explanation, and that was that.
It felt odd telling Chad that in the balance, it sounded like aviation, at least my community, was in practice a very maneuverist organization even though we didn’t talk that way, whereas his was very top-heavy and centralized despite maneuver being a principle recon was told they were following.
Anecdote 2: it’s possible that the baseline level of detail for a ground unit’s order vs a squadron flight’s order is very different. But based on my anecdote above and my fleet experience, the detail was not to micromanage the flight. It was to ensure that all crew members, on all aircraft, had precisely the same conception of what was supposed to happen, and when. And we demanded that level of detail in our mission conception because we are all conscious that when we have 30 Marines in the back, we were one second of confusion, hesitation, or misunderstanding away from becoming an instant mass casualty event. As aircraft commander, failing to understanding a detail on my part means I can kill 30 passengers and 4 aircrew in one heartbeat. There are not a lot of things that can kill 34 Marines in a heartbeat on a battlefield; but I can. So our approach to mission planning is to think the problem through to the level of detail that ensures even seemingly simply tasks don’t turn into 34 obituaries.
Final point: I was also struck by what seemed an immediate impulse in half the orders here to write off the 71st. Brendan and Vinton go into the attack with no further effort to identify whether the unit in front is our allies in the wrong place and potentially having misidentified us. John, I think you and I shared a different impulse, in that there is true uncertainty at play here and that taking the time to positively ID the force in front of us is worth it. If it’s not the 71st, our forces are still deployed in such a fashion that we can go into the attack while observing the MSRs that the enemy might use to attack the flank of the main effort up north. If it is the 71st, we will have prevented the compounding of a fratricide event of green-on-blue that could have longer-term strategic-level implications on our relationship with our ally.
Battalion: Scouts are falling back under fire from hostile forces advancing east from Eot'b. Either those are the 71st Company in the wrong place doing something stupid or the enemy has broken through at Alleghany Crossing. We need to be prepared for both. Clarity on that situation is a CCIR. Concept is to contain hostile forces vicinity Eot'b and envelope left IOT be prepared to seize the crossing.
Bravo: Battle position current location, oriented west. Confirm whether those approaching forces are enemy vehicle types or not. If so, engage to contain enemy vicinity Eot'b. If not, hold fire unless attacked.
Delta, with Charlie in trace: Main effort. Maneuver left via Checkpoint 25 to establish attack position 4 clicks south of Alleghany Crossing. BPT to seize crossing IOT control movement across the wadi.
Delta: Reserve. Follow in trace of Charlie as far as Checkpoint 25. Establish attack position there. BPT reinforce main effort, reinforce Bravo, or attack directly north into Eot'b.
Scouts: Reconnoiter north in direction of Checkpoint 35 IOT clarify situation on north side.
I will be with main effort. Report ANY information clarifying hostile situation directly on Tac 1.
The biggest issue in this situation is deciding whether the hostile force engaging my scouts is enemy or friendly. It's certainly plausible (maybe even probable) that the 71st Company is in the wrong place doing something inexplicable. So I've communicated this as a CCIR to everybody. I'd like to think my scout platoon commander (of all people) is skilled in identifying enemy vehicle types. (I'm assuming this is not a DS-type situation in which half the coalition forces used the same equipment as the Iraqis.) My first action actually would be to talk to my scout platoon commander to get clarification on whether those are friendly or enemy forces. (He has described the hostile force as armored reconnaissance, rather than mechanized infantry, which I would expect the 71st to be.) But since it's not specified in the scenario, I have to assume we don't have that info. So my first task to Bravo Company is to try to identify that hostile force.
Meanwhile, based on the assumption that we no longer control the crossing site (either because 71st Company has moved to Eot'b or the enemy has broken through), my main objective is to re-establish control of the crossing. If in fact, the enemy is flowing forces across the wadi, the best course is to shut it off at the source rather than meet it head on at Eot'b.
I chose my robotic tank company for this task because the situation is highly uncertain, and I'd rather risk my robots than my people. Plus, the ATR of the unmanned vehicles will come in handy. Im' not generally in favor of "be prepared to" tasks because they tend to slow things down, but I use one here because I want to know I can shut off the attack if I learn we're dealing with friendly forces. My hope is we clarify that situation well before Delta gets to its attack position and I can either throw them directly into the attack without pause or call it off.
Uncertainty is the big issue here. By taking action around the south, I will force the situation to clarify there. My scouts are well positioned to reconnoiter around the north side, so I expect to get better SA there. I'm expecting Bravo to clarify what's going on in the center.
I neglected to mention that I will get on the horn to HHQ explaining the situation (which potentially impacts the broader situation) and asking for any resources, probably airborne, that can help provide SA. My use of fires will depend on what I learn about my CCIR.
To task force: Enemy company IVO Eot'B has engaged Scout platoon; Scout withdrawing N to Seif G. Position of 71st Co unknown - keep an eye out but assume that the company at Eot'B is NOT them. We are going to destroy this enemy force.
Scout Platoon: You have mortar priority of fire - use it to suppress/delay enemy company while we establish our defense. Get east of Seif G to stay out of friendly fire. Screen our northern flank from there.
Alpha Co: You are the main effort. Establish ATK By FIRE position south of Rte Alleghany & East of Seif A oriented NW. Keep fires west of Seif G where Scout Platoon is located.
Bravo Co: stop where you are; establish blocking position oriented west on Alleghany.
Charlie Co: you are TF reserve. Send one platoon to reinforce Alpha Co.
Delta Co: (via HQ) - pass through Bravo Co - attack to destroy ENY Co IVO Eot'B
I'm making a big assumption and using autonomous forces differently than I'd use conventional / manned forces.
My big assumption is that the force in Eot'B is, in fact, the enemy. They've engaged my scouts, so at this point I am going to act decisively on that assumption.
I wouldn't send my tank or mech companies in a frontal assault but I'm doing that with my autonomous forces. I doubt they're as "disposable/replaceable" as a cheap quad-copter but I'm willing to trade their nonexistent lives to (best case) rapidly destroy the enemy who threatens my mission. If it works out, perhaps I can seize the crossing point before more enemy cross the wadi. Worst case, I've at least put a buffer between A/B companies and the threat. And maybe, if the forces in Eot'B turn out to be the 71st; I can "turn off" Delta Company faster than I could turn off A or B.
Essentially an L-shaped ambush with Alpha and Bravo, followed by a frontal assault with your robots (Delta). Keeps your force compact and connected. It's interesting that both you and Ian saw the possession of a robotic element as providing you the latitude for more direct, i.e., frontal, tactics.
Implicit in your assessment (clearly and concisely stated, BTW) is that the enemy has gotten through at Alleghany Crossing, which I would see as the bigger problem.
The original title of "Enemy in the Assembly Area" when it appeared in the Marine Corps Gazette (Apr90) was "Enemy Over the Bridge" (ie., EOtB). I changed the title years later when I realized "Enemy Over the Bridge" was giving the problem away. So yes, this was an attempt to recreate that basic dilemma in a different environment with new technology. I have realized that changing those "superficial" factors has resulted in a different scenario.
1.S. "I think our allies, the 71st Company, have been overrun. There are twelve enemy tanks and APCs at EOTB, Checkpoint 21, with more enemy following. Our supporting attack is now a counterattack to block this enemy penetration."
2.M. "Immediately, our Battalion will SEIZE Allegheny Crossing, Checkpoint 10, in order to cut off this enemy and block any follow-on forces."
3.E. "CONOPS. While one company FIXES the enemy at EOTB, Checkpoint 21, our tanks will envelopment north, through Checkpoint 35, and attack to seize the Allegheny Crossing, Checkpoint 10."
Tasks. "Tank-Infantry Task Force - of tanks, "B" Company, and mortars - is our main effort. Envelop north. SEIZE Allegheny Crossing, Checkpoint 10, in order to cut off enemy access to EOTB."
""D" Company. FIX the enemy at EOTB in order to enable the main effort envelopment."
""C" Company. RESERVE. Be prepared to counterattack and destroy the enemy at EOTB, Checkpoint 21, in order to eliminate this threat to our rear area."
"Reconnaissance Platoon. Support "D" Company in fixing the enemy. Be prepared to recon around Serif G to lead "C" Company's counterattack.
We cannot attack the enemy at EOTB until the source of danger is cut off at Allegheny Crossing. Checkpoint 10 is key terrain, and our main effort tank and infantry ATGMs can control it from kilometers away.
I enveloped north, not south, to put our attacking units between the enemy and our friendly units 17 kilometers to the north.
When we have contained the enemy between CP10 and CP21, then "D" Company can envelop North around Seif G and destroy the enemy, again supported by the autonomous "D" Company guns. Depending on what the enemy does in the next thirty minutes, this next operation may require a separate order.
I used the autonomous guns of "D" Company in a supporting role because I wanted the main effort tank company commander to be able to make important decisions forward in an unknown situation. Sending unmanned systems to CP10 would be safer, but less flexible and responsive.
I agree with the main idea of recapturing the crossing as the main effort and containing the situation at Eot'b as a supporting task using economy of force. Focusing the entire task force on the force vic. Eot'b goes after the bright, shiny object without addressing the real issue. Interestingly, I sent my robots on the main effort because of the uncertainty, which is why you sent your manned tank company. I'd rather risk my robots than my men. Also interesting that you chose to go right to allow you to connect with friendly forces vic. Iroquois Crossing. That provides a secure base around which any reinforcements from the north can maneuver. That's a "Go" kind of move that I did not think of. I went left, only because it saved me about 5km of movement, and I thought speed was important.
Order
'Orient to the west.'
'71 Company of Host Nation Forces has occupied Eot'b'.
'I am not sure why it is there. It's supposed to be ten clicks to the west. It may have been defeated by enemy forces. It may also have changed sides'.
'I am going to investigate in person. D Company (Robots) and A Company (Tanks) come with me. As I approach Eot'b, take up positions that allow you to fire upon the forces in the town.'
'I will enter the town on foot, carrying a flag of truce'.
'If I am captured or killed, XO will take command, attack the town, and continue the original mission.'
Rationale
A 'Blue on Green' battle, especially one on a large scale, will do a great deal of damage to the coalition that we are in. Thus, rather than simply attacking - which I would otherwise do - I will bet my life on the continued loyalty of 71 Company.
I'm genuinely curious: why are you exposing the battalion commander, in an already uncertain situation, at night, to either an ally who's trigger happy and has already misidentified you, or an enemy who will likely fire again on anyone approaching their position?
Also, say it is the 71st after all, but they still mistakenly identify you and kill you - your last standing order will be to the XO to assume command and attack the town, instigating the Blue on Green battle you want to avoid. Why not use an alternate method to gain positive ID on whatever units are in Eotb without exposing yourself or further risking Green on Blue?
Our attempts to get positive ID by other means have already failed.
If the 71st is teetering between loyalty and treason, a show of personal courage may tip the balance in our favor. Likewise, if the 71st was, in fact, defeated, such a demonstration will help me rally them. Finally, I expect to negotiate with the man currently in charge of the 71st, and such negotiations can only be conducted face-to-face.
War is politics. And all politics is local.
All companies, our scouts are taking fire from forces east of checkpoint 21. FRAGO follows:
Bravo Company, shift north to join up with our scouts and establish a defensive position on the eastern side of dune Golf. Send dismounts with ATGMs to the crest of the dune to observe and report on troop dispositions in the vicinity of checkpoint 21. Send one platoon further north around the flank of dune Fox to establish observation up and down Route Keuka. All Bravo platoons, weapons hold.
Charlie Company, shift south, have platoons establish defensive positions to the northern and southern flanks of dune Alpha, with the southern platoon observing Route Keuka and northern platoon reporting identification on units in the vicinity of checkpoint 21. Send dismounts to the crest of Alpha with the same instructions as I just gave Bravo Company. Weapons hold.
Delta Company, move around Alpha Company as rapidly as possible to the location our scouts reported contact, utilize your Alpha Tango Romeo systems to attempt identification on those forces that fired on our scouts and report their determination as soon as possible. Weapons hold.
Alpha Company, spread out behind Delta Company oriented west toward checkpoint 21 and be prepared to drive west to support Delta Company if needed. Weapons hold.
All companies, report identification of any units observed near checkpoint 21 immediately. Go.
Rationale: I suspect this may be a case of possible fratricide from our host nation advance unit, but want to be prepared in case this is in fact an enemy advance and the 71st Company got overrun without being able to tell us. With Bravo I want to reinforce my damaged scouts, get dismounts onto the dune to fire on Eotb if needed, but also get eyes on Route Keuka in the direction of our main attack to see if the enemy is potentially advancing into the flank of our attack. If so, Division needs to be warned. I want Charlie to cover my southern flank and put Eotb into a crossfire if needed.
My robots have ATR and no humans aboard - I'm willing to risk them in order to leverage their ATR and figure out if I have the 71st Company in front of me or not. If it's the 71st, I'd rather lose a robot to fratricide while I work out an alternate signal plan to get them to stop firing at me. If it's the enemy, then my robots can blunt their further advance while my tanks come up from behind, and Bravo and Charlie start firing on the enemy from the flanks. Yes, my tanks might be firing through the line of my robots, but I'd prefer to keep my tanks near the road where they can maneuver better than having them drive around sand dunes and again, they're robots. They're expendable, but I'm assuming my tank gunners wait to get solid shots on the enemy rather than shooting my own robots. My robots can capture the enemy's attention while my tanks maneuver behind to cause more damage.
Everyone is weapons hold because I'm not going to compound possible fratricide by the 71st Company on me by committing fratricide back on them with overly loose ROE.
Also, I see we're continuing the valiant effort started in the Cherokee Crossing TDG...
Ian. You're killing me. I read the first paragraph as if I was the "B" Company Commander. After reading the ten(!) micromanagement tasks you issued to me, I still have no idea of the ONE task I'm supposed to accomplish, or how that task fits into the larger plan. What is my single overall task and purpose? What exactly do you want me to do?
"shift north..." [That means 'move,' right?]
"join up..." [Join? Is he attached to me? Do we have the same task?]
"establish... position on the east side of dune Golf..." [For what purpose?]
"send dismounts with ATGMs..." [Micromanagement. I'll decide who goes]
"to the crest..." [Unnecessary.]
"observe and report..." [Unnecessary.]
"send one platoon..." [Micromanagement.]
"all Bravo platoons... [Micromanagement. I'll issue the orders to my platoons.]
"weapons hold..." [Do I need your permission to shoot the enemy?]
The other company commanders and I are all competent leaders. You do not have to move us like puppets. "Alpha Company... spread out... orient west... drive west..."
So some of this seems to be arguing over semantics. “Shift” vs “move” north—it’s a happy to glad distinction, which I would think the company commander understands either way as “I want you to go north.”
As to the level of detail, like I said in the rationale, I see this as a very fraught moment. This could be fratricide, this could be enemy to my front. Each one of my orders to the companies carries the underlying message of: identify what’s in front, and do not be loose with fires and make a potentially bad fratricidal situation worse.
As commander, I’ll damn well decide weapons conditions for my subordinate units if I think a more restrictive ROE is needed. Weapons hold does not restrict self-defense; but I want ID on what is in front us and my weapons conditions makes that clear. And I’m sending my human units to places where I think the risk of them getting mistakenly fired on is less; I’m sending my robots where the odds of getting fired on are certainly greater, because fires have already occurred, but I would take a dead robot due to friendly fire that I can then disentangle with my ally, if that’s who it is, over friendly fire that gets Marines killed.
I see a few interesting thoughts embedded here: (1) "I'm sending my human units to places where I think the risk of them getting mistakenly fired on is less." A rationale for the employment of robotics I have not heard before. (2) Leveraging the ATR capability of autonomous systems to determine friend or foe by sending them directly into harm's way. (3) Putting dismounted infantry on the ridges around Eot'b essentially commits to a positional fight there and limits opportunities for maneuver elsewhere (I'm thinking against the crossing)-- unless you're thinking of leaving the dismounted infantry in place and maneuvering with vehicles only.
WRT Brendan's comments, at a minimum I think we can all agree that an example of a mission-type order this is not.
So I will offer that we are crafting orders based on our backgrounds. You’re thinking like ground leaders, which makes sense unless Vinton has some flight time he’s forgotten to tell me about. I’m thinking like an aviator, and the lesson pounded into our heads is: be directive, then descriptive. To take an extreme example: following the purest understanding of mission-type orders, were I to see a SAM launched at an aircraft in my section, if I start with “Tiger 20, my intent is that you avoid the missile coming at you, take evasive action—“ Tiger 20 is dead before I get past “my intent.” My actual order to Tiger 20 would be “20, break right, pop chaff and flares, SAM at your 5 o’clock low.” My intent is implicit in the directive I give: I want Tiger 20 to not get hit by the missile.
All my orders to my maneuver units here are directive, then descriptive. I want movement and disposition first. Implicit in each directive is that I want to ID what’s in front of us, and I do not want to accidentally shoot allied forces. We have 5 minutes to think and deliver our orders; look at my timers below, and I think we can all get to the “why” after the first minute or so of saying “what.”
I’ll admit that my level of detail to platoon maneuver may seem excessive, but I will again offer based on my background, if I were briefing a large flight of aircraft, I would go into high levels of detail on where I want aircraft to land, where I want weapons pointed, what target reference points are, what weapons and survivability gear conditions we will be at, because the last thing I want confusion about is whether at night, dash 7 is supposed to be echelon left or echelon right behind dash 6 in the LZ. A battalion CO directing platoon employment? OK, I’ll admit I don’t have the experience in that department to know if that’s non-standard. A squadron CO—also an O5 commander—telling each and every aircraft where and when he wants it during a flight brief? Absolutely nothing unusual in that in my (former) world.
If a part of mission-type orders is expeditious delivery of instructions, then here’s what our respective orders timed out at when I read them out loud:
Brendan: 1 minute 9 seconds
John: 1 minute 12 seconds
Vinton: 53 seconds, kudos to you for coming in under a minute
My orders: 1 minute 14 seconds
Yes, I went into greater detail. It took me 2 seconds longer than the next guy.
One more digression on aviation orders/tasking and then I’ll shut up about it. Well, one digression with two anecdotes. Anecdote 1: I had a conversation with Chad Skaggs like 7 or 8 years ago when we were working together in the Warfighting Society, and we were comparing experiences on whether maneuver warfare was truly practiced anywhere in the Marine Corps. My assumption was that ground units were more maneuverist since maneuver warfare has a heavy ground flavor, and NCOs have greater levels of tactical authority than their aviation equivalents. I also assumed ground units studied, or least gave lip service to, actual doctrine like MCDP-1, because core doctrine was certainly never a topic of discussion in the squadron ready room. I figured Chad, being with LAR, was super-maneuvery since a recon unit would have to be, right? He surprised me by saying he felt constantly micromanaged when in the field, always having to stop every 10 minutes to deliver some update to higher, or with higher stepping in on him based on false levels of SA provided by UAS or BFT. He felt frustrated at not being able to practice maneuver warfare, despite talking about it.
I compared that to my aviation world, where like I said, no one’s cracking open MCDP-1 in the ready room. But comparing my practical experiences to his, I felt like I was highly maneuverist in execution. If I was taking a section of aircraft “over the hill” from Miramar—leaving Miramar to enter the Yuma training area—once I was out of line-of-sight comms with our squadron duty officer, I was on my own. I had the mission I’d briefed in the ready room, but I had full authority to call audibles on how we executed training, adjust timelines and routes, and modify or cancel things entirely if in my judgment it was necessary to do so. If I had a cell phone signal in the training area, I might text the duty officer to brief them on my decisions to change or cancel things. If I didn’t have a cell phone signal, then the first inkling the CO would get that I’d changed the plan was when I got back over the hill with line-of-sight comms and told the duty officer I was 20 minutes out, I’d modified or cancelled for reason XYZ, and I’d provide full details when we landed. And this wasn’t just in a training environment—in Iraq and Afghanistan, there were wide swathes of desert where we had comms with virtually no one, and so if I had to execute changes based on commander’s intent from the original brief, I just did it. I’m conscious of only one occasion where, when I got back, the squadron XO questioned me on why a mission had not gone as planned; we spent more time on the deck at Dwyer than we were scheduled to. I told him it was because the ADACG had begun using a new type of cargo container that was flimsier than the old one; hadn’t alerted us to the changes; and so our crew chiefs were trying to figure out how to properly load crappy tri-walls that kept collapsing on them when stacked. The XO took the explanation, and that was that.
It felt odd telling Chad that in the balance, it sounded like aviation, at least my community, was in practice a very maneuverist organization even though we didn’t talk that way, whereas his was very top-heavy and centralized despite maneuver being a principle recon was told they were following.
Anecdote 2: it’s possible that the baseline level of detail for a ground unit’s order vs a squadron flight’s order is very different. But based on my anecdote above and my fleet experience, the detail was not to micromanage the flight. It was to ensure that all crew members, on all aircraft, had precisely the same conception of what was supposed to happen, and when. And we demanded that level of detail in our mission conception because we are all conscious that when we have 30 Marines in the back, we were one second of confusion, hesitation, or misunderstanding away from becoming an instant mass casualty event. As aircraft commander, failing to understanding a detail on my part means I can kill 30 passengers and 4 aircrew in one heartbeat. There are not a lot of things that can kill 34 Marines in a heartbeat on a battlefield; but I can. So our approach to mission planning is to think the problem through to the level of detail that ensures even seemingly simply tasks don’t turn into 34 obituaries.
Final point: I was also struck by what seemed an immediate impulse in half the orders here to write off the 71st. Brendan and Vinton go into the attack with no further effort to identify whether the unit in front is our allies in the wrong place and potentially having misidentified us. John, I think you and I shared a different impulse, in that there is true uncertainty at play here and that taking the time to positively ID the force in front of us is worth it. If it’s not the 71st, our forces are still deployed in such a fashion that we can go into the attack while observing the MSRs that the enemy might use to attack the flank of the main effort up north. If it is the 71st, we will have prevented the compounding of a fratricide event of green-on-blue that could have longer-term strategic-level implications on our relationship with our ally.
Battalion: Scouts are falling back under fire from hostile forces advancing east from Eot'b. Either those are the 71st Company in the wrong place doing something stupid or the enemy has broken through at Alleghany Crossing. We need to be prepared for both. Clarity on that situation is a CCIR. Concept is to contain hostile forces vicinity Eot'b and envelope left IOT be prepared to seize the crossing.
Bravo: Battle position current location, oriented west. Confirm whether those approaching forces are enemy vehicle types or not. If so, engage to contain enemy vicinity Eot'b. If not, hold fire unless attacked.
Delta, with Charlie in trace: Main effort. Maneuver left via Checkpoint 25 to establish attack position 4 clicks south of Alleghany Crossing. BPT to seize crossing IOT control movement across the wadi.
Delta: Reserve. Follow in trace of Charlie as far as Checkpoint 25. Establish attack position there. BPT reinforce main effort, reinforce Bravo, or attack directly north into Eot'b.
Scouts: Reconnoiter north in direction of Checkpoint 35 IOT clarify situation on north side.
I will be with main effort. Report ANY information clarifying hostile situation directly on Tac 1.
The biggest issue in this situation is deciding whether the hostile force engaging my scouts is enemy or friendly. It's certainly plausible (maybe even probable) that the 71st Company is in the wrong place doing something inexplicable. So I've communicated this as a CCIR to everybody. I'd like to think my scout platoon commander (of all people) is skilled in identifying enemy vehicle types. (I'm assuming this is not a DS-type situation in which half the coalition forces used the same equipment as the Iraqis.) My first action actually would be to talk to my scout platoon commander to get clarification on whether those are friendly or enemy forces. (He has described the hostile force as armored reconnaissance, rather than mechanized infantry, which I would expect the 71st to be.) But since it's not specified in the scenario, I have to assume we don't have that info. So my first task to Bravo Company is to try to identify that hostile force.
Meanwhile, based on the assumption that we no longer control the crossing site (either because 71st Company has moved to Eot'b or the enemy has broken through), my main objective is to re-establish control of the crossing. If in fact, the enemy is flowing forces across the wadi, the best course is to shut it off at the source rather than meet it head on at Eot'b.
I chose my robotic tank company for this task because the situation is highly uncertain, and I'd rather risk my robots than my people. Plus, the ATR of the unmanned vehicles will come in handy. Im' not generally in favor of "be prepared to" tasks because they tend to slow things down, but I use one here because I want to know I can shut off the attack if I learn we're dealing with friendly forces. My hope is we clarify that situation well before Delta gets to its attack position and I can either throw them directly into the attack without pause or call it off.
Uncertainty is the big issue here. By taking action around the south, I will force the situation to clarify there. My scouts are well positioned to reconnoiter around the north side, so I expect to get better SA there. I'm expecting Bravo to clarify what's going on in the center.
I neglected to mention that I will get on the horn to HHQ explaining the situation (which potentially impacts the broader situation) and asking for any resources, probably airborne, that can help provide SA. My use of fires will depend on what I learn about my CCIR.
To task force: Enemy company IVO Eot'B has engaged Scout platoon; Scout withdrawing N to Seif G. Position of 71st Co unknown - keep an eye out but assume that the company at Eot'B is NOT them. We are going to destroy this enemy force.
Scout Platoon: You have mortar priority of fire - use it to suppress/delay enemy company while we establish our defense. Get east of Seif G to stay out of friendly fire. Screen our northern flank from there.
Alpha Co: You are the main effort. Establish ATK By FIRE position south of Rte Alleghany & East of Seif A oriented NW. Keep fires west of Seif G where Scout Platoon is located.
Bravo Co: stop where you are; establish blocking position oriented west on Alleghany.
Charlie Co: you are TF reserve. Send one platoon to reinforce Alpha Co.
Delta Co: (via HQ) - pass through Bravo Co - attack to destroy ENY Co IVO Eot'B
Mortars: get fired cap'd now.
I'm making a big assumption and using autonomous forces differently than I'd use conventional / manned forces.
My big assumption is that the force in Eot'B is, in fact, the enemy. They've engaged my scouts, so at this point I am going to act decisively on that assumption.
I wouldn't send my tank or mech companies in a frontal assault but I'm doing that with my autonomous forces. I doubt they're as "disposable/replaceable" as a cheap quad-copter but I'm willing to trade their nonexistent lives to (best case) rapidly destroy the enemy who threatens my mission. If it works out, perhaps I can seize the crossing point before more enemy cross the wadi. Worst case, I've at least put a buffer between A/B companies and the threat. And maybe, if the forces in Eot'B turn out to be the 71st; I can "turn off" Delta Company faster than I could turn off A or B.
Essentially an L-shaped ambush with Alpha and Bravo, followed by a frontal assault with your robots (Delta). Keeps your force compact and connected. It's interesting that both you and Ian saw the possession of a robotic element as providing you the latitude for more direct, i.e., frontal, tactics.
Implicit in your assessment (clearly and concisely stated, BTW) is that the enemy has gotten through at Alleghany Crossing, which I would see as the bigger problem.
Easter Egg guess...is this a revised version of "Enemy in the Assembly Area," updated with new tech?
The original title of "Enemy in the Assembly Area" when it appeared in the Marine Corps Gazette (Apr90) was "Enemy Over the Bridge" (ie., EOtB). I changed the title years later when I realized "Enemy Over the Bridge" was giving the problem away. So yes, this was an attempt to recreate that basic dilemma in a different environment with new technology. I have realized that changing those "superficial" factors has resulted in a different scenario.
"All stations!"
1.S. "I think our allies, the 71st Company, have been overrun. There are twelve enemy tanks and APCs at EOTB, Checkpoint 21, with more enemy following. Our supporting attack is now a counterattack to block this enemy penetration."
2.M. "Immediately, our Battalion will SEIZE Allegheny Crossing, Checkpoint 10, in order to cut off this enemy and block any follow-on forces."
3.E. "CONOPS. While one company FIXES the enemy at EOTB, Checkpoint 21, our tanks will envelopment north, through Checkpoint 35, and attack to seize the Allegheny Crossing, Checkpoint 10."
Tasks. "Tank-Infantry Task Force - of tanks, "B" Company, and mortars - is our main effort. Envelop north. SEIZE Allegheny Crossing, Checkpoint 10, in order to cut off enemy access to EOTB."
""D" Company. FIX the enemy at EOTB in order to enable the main effort envelopment."
""C" Company. RESERVE. Be prepared to counterattack and destroy the enemy at EOTB, Checkpoint 21, in order to eliminate this threat to our rear area."
"Reconnaissance Platoon. Support "D" Company in fixing the enemy. Be prepared to recon around Serif G to lead "C" Company's counterattack.
Discussion.
We cannot attack the enemy at EOTB until the source of danger is cut off at Allegheny Crossing. Checkpoint 10 is key terrain, and our main effort tank and infantry ATGMs can control it from kilometers away.
I enveloped north, not south, to put our attacking units between the enemy and our friendly units 17 kilometers to the north.
When we have contained the enemy between CP10 and CP21, then "D" Company can envelop North around Seif G and destroy the enemy, again supported by the autonomous "D" Company guns. Depending on what the enemy does in the next thirty minutes, this next operation may require a separate order.
I used the autonomous guns of "D" Company in a supporting role because I wanted the main effort tank company commander to be able to make important decisions forward in an unknown situation. Sending unmanned systems to CP10 would be safer, but less flexible and responsive.
I agree with the main idea of recapturing the crossing as the main effort and containing the situation at Eot'b as a supporting task using economy of force. Focusing the entire task force on the force vic. Eot'b goes after the bright, shiny object without addressing the real issue. Interestingly, I sent my robots on the main effort because of the uncertainty, which is why you sent your manned tank company. I'd rather risk my robots than my men. Also interesting that you chose to go right to allow you to connect with friendly forces vic. Iroquois Crossing. That provides a secure base around which any reinforcements from the north can maneuver. That's a "Go" kind of move that I did not think of. I went left, only because it saved me about 5km of movement, and I thought speed was important.